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TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: A SURVEY OF THE DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S F--ETC(U)

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: A SURVEY OF THE
DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY

by

Jerry Wayne Milam

December 1978

Thesis Advisor:

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Toward Independence:
A Survey of the Determinants of Turkey's Foreign Policy

by

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
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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

He who does not heed proverbs will
not avoid mistakes.- Turkish Proverb¹

His mother an onion, his father garlic,
himself comes out conserve of rose.-
Turkish Proverb

The transformation of Turkey from the traditional Islamic Ottoman Empire into a modern nation-state, the Republic of Turkey, stands out as one of the most impressive developments of the Twentieth century. Although the transformation appeared to be a reduction of Turkey from a major power to a small nation status, it was only an outward illusion since, as George Lenczowski points out, "in reality the old Empire had been weak and disintegrating while the reborn Turkey of Kemal [Atatürk] proved to be a relatively strong, closely knit, and homogeneous political organism."²

The Turkish Republic which emerged from the ashes of World War I under the skillful leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic and the father of modern Turkey, was destined to play an important role in global politics. Historically, Turkey is located on one of, if not the most, strategic and traditionally most coveted pieces of territory on the globe.³ She not only controls the Turkish Straits which link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, but also the historic invasion routes from the Balkans and the Caucasus Mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn commands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil rich Persian

Gulf and the Red Sea. Therefore, Turkey, with borders on Europe, the Middle East and the Soviet Union possesses a role in world politics far greater than her size, population and economic strength would indicate.

The geostrategic importance of Turkey for the major actors in the international system has varied in relation to technological advancements, the intensity of their rivalry and the focal point or geographic location of their conflicts.⁴ Also, as one might expect based upon power politics neither the United States nor the Soviet Union -- the dominant world powers since World War II -- have apparently not felt any moral or legal obligation to place Turkey's needs above their own national interests. It was assumed that a foreign policy that protected their own interests would at the same time serve and protect Turkish interests.

While it is obvious that Turkish foreign policy after 1947 was a by-product and an extension of American policy towards the Soviet Union, and consequently towards the Middle East and the Third World countries as well, one should not simply dismiss Turkey as a pawn of the West during the Cold War period. To do so would be to give no credit to the Turkish statesmen and to completely disregard Turkey's dire needs during that period. Turkish-American relations following World War II were solidly based on mutual interests and common aspirations. Their alliance was based primarily on the American postwar policy of "containment" and Turkey's requirement for both military and economic

assistance. George Harris describes the Turkish-American alliance as one within which "disagreements that did crop up were dwarfed by the impressive coincidence of interests of the parties and their commitment to each other."⁵

In the early 1960s it would have been difficult to imagine that, within a few short years, deep anti-American sentiments would emerge in Turkey. It would have been even harder to imagine a Turkish rapprochement with the Soviets. Nevertheless, the mid-1960s witnessed a steady rise in Turkish disillusionment with the West, increasing anti-Americanism and a concomitant foreign policy reorientation, including an improvement in Turkish-Soviet relations.

The 1970s have witnessed a dramatic reappraisal of Turkish foreign policy. Rapprochement with the Soviet Union led to the signing of an important political document in 1978, calling for increased friendship and greater economic cooperation between these two former archenemies.⁶

Of the various factors instrumental in bringing about the present orientation in Turkish foreign policy, the Cyprus dispute stands out. However, to attribute the changes in Turkey solely to the events surrounding the Cyprus question would be ludicrous and constitute a very shallow observation. An examination of the political dynamics of Turkish foreign policy will reveal that there were very potent factors other than Cyprus involved in Turkey's transition -- factors such as detente, the energy crisis, and political and social changes in Turkey.

In fact, the number and potency of these other variables were such that Turkish foreign policy was destined for change with or without the Cyprus dispute. A case in point is Soviet-Turkish rapprochement which began prior to the first significant dispute on Cyprus. Of course, the events surrounding Cyprus undoubtedly hastened and intensified change in Turkish policies. Therefore, in this respect, Cyprus can most certainly be considered the catalyst for change in Turkish foreign policy.

The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze the various factors that contributed to Turkey's shift from a strict Western oriented foreign policy toward a more independent and multilateral policy. Although the focus of this study will be on Turkey's deteriorating Western relations, especially her American relations, it will necessarily touch upon the variables leading to Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and better relations with the Middle Eastern and other Third World countries.

Foreign policy consists of decisions and actions which involve relations of states with each other. Any given foreign policy act or decision reflects the idiosyncracies of the decision maker⁷ and result from a complex synthesis of three broad categories of considerations. First is domestic politics within the foreign policy decision maker's state. Second is the economic and military capability of his state. And third is the international context, that is, the particular position in which the decision maker's state finds itself

specifically in relation to other states in the system. Each in turn affects the other through inherent linkages that produce dynamic and continuous changes in the political, economic and social life of the state.

Domestic or foreign political events and decisions cannot be separated from past experiences and historical backgrounds. The past experiences and historical background along with geopolitical imperatives place certain constraints on a state's decision makers. To understand the policies of any country, it is essential to know and understand these factors. Therefore, while the main interest of this study is the political dynamics of Turkish foreign policy after World War II, Chapter II deals with the issues and determinants of Turkish foreign policy between 1918 and 1945. To provide a brief analysis of the historical background to Turkey's post World War II policies, the political events and their determinants are examined in three subgroups: 1918-1923, 1923-1938, and 1938-1954. In this and the following chapters an effort is made to show the linkage between the domestic and foreign policy, and the impact of international factors on both.

Chapter III deals with the period immediately following World War II up to but not including the 1960 military coup.

Chapter IV covers the period from the 1960 coup up to 1969. Attention is given in this chapter to the basic political changes which followed the coup.

Chapter V analyzes the events of the 1970s to date.

In each of these three chapters (III, IV, V), following an analysis of the domestic and international factors influencing Turkish foreign policy during that particular period, a look is taken at specific Turkish foreign policy interaction with the two major actors in the system, the United States and the Soviet Union. Turkey's relations with the Arabs and other Third World countries are also examined.

A historical-analytical approach was used to identify the roots of Turkey's current foreign policy. Since this study is a foreign policy analysis, not a foreign policy history, no attempt was made to document in this work all of Turkey's foreign relations with the specific nations cover. Rather, specific events and decisions received attention only if they illustrated a trend or a reaction to a particular event of interest, or if they in themselves produce a significant reaction in Turkey's foreign policy.

Chapter VI attempts to provide a comprehensive summary of those factors which have affected Turkish policy in the past, as well as those that are determinants of Turkey's present policy. By examining the various forces which are active today and projecting those which may be significant in the future, various options for new orientations in Turkish foreign policy are examined. Finally a forecast for the future of Turkey's foreign policy is offered.

CHAPTER I FOOTNOTES

¹This and all other Turkish proverbs used in this work may be found in Selwyn Gurney Champion, comp., Racial Proverbs, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950), pp. 477-483.

²George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 3rd ed. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 128.

³Napoleon is said to have placed such importance on the Turkish Straits that he declared his willingness "to abandon mastery over half the world rather than yield Russia those narrow straits." See Ferenc A. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. ix.

⁴Obviously Turkey's strategic geographic location was important in respect to the American "containment" policy. When the focal point of US-Soviet confrontation shifted to Korea, then to Cuba and then to Southeast Asia, the relative importance of Turkey's position decreased. However, with the current focus on Soviet involvement in Africa, the volatility of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the increased importance of Arab oil, Turkey's geostrategic position once again demands attention.

⁵George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971 (Washington and Stanford: American Enterprise Institute and Hoover Institution, 1972), p. 3.

⁶For a detailed account of Turkish-American relations between 1945 and 1971, see Harris, Troubled Alliance.

⁷This study does not deal specifically with individual Turkish leaders and their idiosyncrasies. However, an excellent study dealing with this variable is available. See Metin Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976).

II. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
BETWEEN THE WARS: 1918-1945

Call the bear uncle until you have crossed
the bridge. - Turkish Proverb

He who loves the rose resigns himself to
suffering from the thorns. - Turkish Proverb

A grand chapter in Turkish history ended with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. The Treaty of Lausanne which was finally signed on 24 July 1923 re-established complete and undivided Turkish sovereignty in almost all the territory included in the present day Turkish Republic, and the Capitulations -- so strongly resented by Turks as a symbol of inferiority and subservience -- were abolished. Although it contained restrictions on the straits, the Treaty of Lausanne was essentially international recognition of the demands expressed in the Turkish National Pact. Thus, asserts Bernard Lewis, "Turkey, alone among the defeated powers of the First World War, succeeded in rising from her own ruins and, rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by the victors, secured the acceptance of her own terms."¹ A new era had begun.

Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of historical experiences of being reduced from a vast empire to relative nothingness, and then having to struggle back to save the national homeland and independence. The struggle for survival and the play of realpolitik in the international

arena left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of its people.

Historical experiences cannot be separated from the present day life of a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both internal and external forces within the international political arena based on their historical impressions, prejudices and national image of themselves and other nations. Good or bad, right or wrong, historical experiences color a nation's reaction to events and forces in the political system. For this reason, although the focal point of this study is Turkish foreign policy since World War II, issues and determinants of Turkey's foreign policy from World War I through World War II will be examined.

The Turkish Republic that rose from the ashes of the First World War bore little resemblance to its forerunner, the Ottoman Empire. The new Turkey was not an empire, but a relatively small nation-state; not an autocracy or theocracy, but a democracy and a parliamentary system; not a state founded on expansionist principles, but a nation dedicated to peaceful co-existence; not a multi-national, multi-racial, and multi-religious state, but a homogeneous and united people. Her aims were not to create and expand an empire, but to build and perpetuate a strong stable nation within the boundaries of her homeland. Yet, in this new endeavor there were numerous obstacles to be overcome. In addition to the radical and revolutionary changes that Atatürk began to introduce, Turkey

had to try to adjust her political position in the international arena under the impact of systemic and subsystemic forces.

The period of Turkish history under consideration in this chapter can best be examined in three time-periods, since different forces both external and internal were active during each period.

The first period, 1918-23, was the time of the Turkish War for Independence.

The second period, 1923-1938 was the era of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. It was an era of building, reconstruction, social revolution and reforms at every level of social, economic and political activity. It was the time of a race for modernization -- a race in which Turkey had a late start of at least a hundred years.

The years of 1939-45 belonged to İnönü and the Republican Peoples' Party. It was the time of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War alignments in the international system.

A. THE BIRTH OF THE REPUBLIC: 1918-1923

The settlements imposed by the Allies following World War I were harsh and vindictive. The terms of the Treaty of Sevres which was signed by Sultan Vahideddin's representatives on 10 August 1920 would have left Turkey helpless and a mere shadow state existing on the whims of the powers and peoples who were annexing her richest lands.²

The treaty was not, however, implemented. Atatürk was able to unite the various elements of resistance which had formed in Turkey and lead them to success. The thoughts and motivations of the majority of the Turkish people were expressed in the opening phrases of Atatürk's call for a nationalist movement:

The unity of the Fatherland and national independence are in danger.

The Istanbul government is unable to carry out its responsibilities.

It is only through the nation's efforts and determination that national independence will be won.

It is necessary to establish a national committee, free from all external influences and control, that will review the national situation and make known to the world the people's desire for justice.

This message, issued in June 1919 and known as the Amasya Protocol, was to become the key note of the nationalist program during the next few years.³

During this period of time, 1918-1923, it is easy to see that Turkish foreign policy was based on a desperate will to survive as a nation and a viable political entity, and to maintain the independence of the Turkish people. The struggle for independence took place in the aftermath of a military defeat and the collapse of an extensive political system.⁴

The long and bitter struggle that ensued during and after World War I left the Turk cynical and distrustful of most

foreign powers and peoples -- in a state of near xenophobia. Although the war had left the Turk bitter and cynical, he did not become either pessimistic or desperate about his future. If anything, external pressure and internal struggle awoke in the Turkish people the long dormant spirit of self-reliance and perseverance -- the characteristics that had made the Ottomans the rulers of one of the greatest empires in history. This spirit and feeling were later expressed by Atatürk when he exclaimed, "Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk."⁵

Notwithstanding the overwhelming domestic and foreign policy problems, the Turks under Atatürk were able to expell the foreign powers -- some by force and others through negotiations -- from the Turkish homeland. They were now ready to undertake the radical social and political reforms that were to lay the foundation of a Western oriented, republican system of government in Turkey.

B. THE ATATÜRK ERA: 1923-1938

The breakup following World War I of the Ottoman, the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian Empires -- empires that had played significant if not crucial roles in the international political and economic system -- signaled change for the system. The disintegration of these three great empires increased the number and changed the quality of the actors in the international system. Most of the new actors were politically unstable and economically weak compared to the victorious powers

of World War I. World politics and economics were still primarily determined by the relations among European nations, just as had been the case prior to the war. Asia and Africa were the imperial prizes for which the great powers of Europe contended. The major change during this period between the two World Wars was that the locus of important actors was expanded to include the United States and Japan. And, for its part, the United States was content to be a spectator to the European struggle for empires.

The political indicators of this period in which the new Turkish nation found itself were colonialism, industrialistic-capitalist growth and its counter part, communism. Victors and vanquished alike were engaged in reconstruction of their economies.

Within the political realities of this international system Atatürk began the laborious task of reconstruction and modernization of Turkey. To Atatürk this modernization equated to Westernization. Modernization in terms of the West was not a novel thought in Turkish history. After a series of Ottoman defeats at the hands of Western powers, Selim III (1789-1807) began a program of "defensive modernization," which due to various factors, including the preservation of the traditional elements of social and spiritual culture, enjoyed only limited success up to the time of Atatürk.⁶ Most Ottoman and Turkish modernizers did agree upon one basic assumption, and that was, as so well stated

by Abdullah Ceudet (1869-1932), co-founder of the Society of Union and Progress and most farsighted of the Young Turk political writers: "There is no second civilization: civilization means European civilization, and it must be imported with both its roses and thorns."⁷ Atatürk believed in European civilization and was willing to accept "both its roses and its thorns."

In order to carry out the radical reforms necessary to breakdown the traditional social and spiritual culture of Turkey and transform it into a secular and Western culture, Atatürk needed a strong political power base as a source of authority.⁸ Fortunately, 19th century experiments with Western education had produced an educated official class which Atatürk used to form the nucleus of Turkey's modernizing elites -- the Republican Peoples' Party.⁹ This elite group of administrators, under Atatürks' guidance and within the framework of a one-party authoritarian regime, imposed revolutionary changes from the top. This pattern of elite, one-party politics was to set the trend in Turkish politics many years to come.¹⁰

During the period of Atatürk Turkish policies were based on a set of principles popularly known as the "Six Arrows."¹¹ These principles were:

Republicanism was directed against the re-establishment of the sultanate and caliphate. It recognized the republican form of government as that which would realize most safely the ideal of national sovereignty.

Nationalism was based on common citizenship and devotion to the national idea. It therefore, repudiated pan-Turkist, pan-Turanist or pan-Islamic ambitions.

Populism repudiated class privileges and provided equally in law.

Etatism stood for a constructive and productive intervention by the state in the national economy.

Secularism separated religion from the state.

Revolutionism (Reformism) provided the state with a political principle that would justify radical changes. 12

Atatürk's social and cultural revolution was successful for numerous reasons, a few of which warrant mentioning in the context of this study. First, the years of relative calm and disengagement from armed conflict in the inter-national arena provided the time needed for Turkey's transformation. Second, the establishment of a clear distinction between the army and the government "not only facilitated the transition from empire to republic, it also enabled Turkey in the 1920s to overcome the affliction of militarism."¹³ Finally, timing of his major reform programs greatly increased Atatürk's chances for success. Between 1919 and 1923 Atatürk successfully defended Turkish sovereignty and replaced the old imperial consciousness with a fierce nationalism. Then, in 1924, after erecting the institutions of his new state and consolidating his power he proceeded with his reforms.

Although the keynote of Turkey's internal policies, especially during the two decades following World War I, was

"change", her foreign policy was that of a status quo power. With the exception of Iskenderun (Alexandretta), which Turkey regained from Syria in 1939, and Mosul, which it ceded to Iraq in 1926, the present borders of Turkey are those outlined in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This indeed reflected a departure from the militant expansionist ideology of the Ottoman Empire. Foreign relations of Atatürk's Turkey were dominated by concerns for genuine independence and sovereignty. It was colored by historical memories of foreign intervention, economic dependency and a lack of jurisdiction over aliens or foreign-protected citizens.¹⁴ Just as it gave Atatürk the time needed for internal reforms, the peaceful international period following the Turkish War of Independence greatly helped the implementation of Turkey's independent foreign policy.

"Peace at home, peace in the world"¹⁵ was the slogan which gave direction to Atatürk's foreign policy. Edward Weisband concludes that of all the "great socio-political revolutions in the history of the modern state... the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey represents the only one that has produced an ideology of peace."¹⁶ During Atatürk's time, the two dominant axioms of Turkish foreign policy were:

- 1) The priority of peace, sovereignty and national development over expansionist-revisionism, and;
- 2) The belief that the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to the security of Turkey.

17

In light of the first principle of "peace, sovereignty and national development," it was a cautious and realistic assessment of the nation's conditions that led Atatürk to suggest strongly a policy of external non-involvement and internal development. His advisors urged Ataturk to enter an alliance with one of the great European powers, but he chose to pursue a neutralist policy and began establishing and emphasizing security and peace with all Turkey's neighbors.¹⁸

Despite traditional animosities, a Greek-Turkish treaty was concluded in 1930. This was followed in 1934 by the Balkan Entente Pact which united Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Turkey in a mutual guarantee of peace, independence, and territorial integrity. The pact was in large part a reaction to Italy's revisionism. A noteworthy provision of the Balkan Pact was the one which exempted Turkey from any obligation to the pact if it involved hostilities with the Soviet Union. Ideally, Bulgaria should have been included in the Balkan Pact, but, probably based on her resentment of the Neuilly Treaty of 1920 which broke up Bulgaria and transferred some of her lands to Greece and Yugoslavia, she refused membership. In 1937, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan concluded the Saadabad pact, which established an Eastern Entente.¹⁹

Revisionist actions by Italy and Germany during the 1930s forced Turkey's involvement in the international system beyond mere regional concerns. It was through her efforts in the League of Nations, which she had joined in 1932, that

Turkey was successful in changing some of the clauses of the Lausanne Treaty which pertained to the Turkish Straits. The Montreux Convention of 1936 restored the control of the Straits to the Turkish government, and gave Turkey the right to re-militarize them. Turkey was supported in this action by the Soviet Union who endeavored to reduce the freedom of the non-riparian states to enter the Black Sea. Because of the rising German danger to European peace, and not wanting to antagonize the Soviet Union, both Great Britain and France went along with the new provisions. The Montreux Convention is still (1978) in effect.²⁰

The second principle of Turkish foreign policy ideology, namely, that "the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to Turkey's security, " had its roots deeply embedded in history. Since the 17th century, Russia's expansionist policies had helped it to become the "archenemy" of the Ottomans. A succession of major defeats at Russian hands had consistently confronted the Sublime Porte with the realities of its declining power. Moreover, it was Tzar Nicholas I who described Turkey as the "sick man of Europe" when he proposed to the British in 1844 that the Ottoman Empire be partitioned. The final of thirteen Russo-Turkish wars was of course the First World War. It was Atatürk himself, commanding the Sixteenth army, who succeeded in stopping the Russian forces.²¹

Thus, it is one of the ironies of history that the Russian Government was the first to recognize Atatürk's regime as the

legitimate government of the new Turkey. Actually, the reasons for the "friendly" relations between Turkey and Russia during this early period are quite obvious. Both countries were undergoing concurrent revolutions and both leaders, Lenin and Atatürk, were engaged in consolidation of their internal power and feared Western involvement in their internal affairs. The first official diplomatic undertaking of Atatürk government was Bekir Sami Bey's mission to Moscow in 1920 to gain arms, money and other forms of support from Lenin's government. In 1921 a Treaty of Friendship was concluded between Turkey and the Soviet Union -- a treaty advantageous for both parties. The treaty formalized the border agreements made a year earlier (Alexandropol Treaty) and both parties promised to refrain from supporting "seditious groups and activities on the other's territory." This last provision eased Lenin's mind concerning any pan-Turkist or pan-Turanist movements in Russia, but it also gave Atatürk the legal justification he wanted to suppress the Turkish Communists.²²

When the 1921 Treaty was concluded, both Turkey and the Soviet Union considered themselves revisionist and anti-Entente. However, after Lausanne, Turkey became quite satisfied with her own peace settlement and turned to essentially a status quo posture. The Soviets on the other hand continued to oppose the status quo. It is difficult to say whether or not the 1921 Treaty would have been renewed without the controversy of Mosul, but it is a fact that the day after the League of

Nations decided the Mosul question in favor of British mandated Iraq, the Turkish foreign minister rushed to Paris and concluded a new treaty of friendship and nonaggression with the Soviet Union. Although the Turkish Communists had been crushed by the iron hand of Atatürk, the Soviets willingly signed a new treaty since it represented a means to check British domination of the Near East and aided in their attempt to avoid isolation in the wake of the Locarno negotiations.²³

After 1925 Turkish-Soviet relations started to cool. The Soviets could not approve the stern measures taken against the Turkish Communist, and "in 1928-29, in the course of a general ideological reorientation in Moscow... (Atatürk) was abruptly transformed from a revolutionary hero to a reactionary tyrant."²⁴ The Soviets increased communist activity in Turkey and this led to more forceful repression by the Turks. However, an event of this time period points out the flexibility of Turkish diplomacy and highlights the Soviet's willingness to exploit any weakness in the West.

The New York Stock Exchange crash of 1929 ushered in the "great depression" which quickly spread economic chaos and ruin around the world. Turkey had not yet been fully assimilated into the Western capitalist free enterprise system, and being primarily an agricultural society she was able to feed her own people and protect them against the most devastating consequences of the depression. However, the fall in world food prices left Turkey's new industries vulnerable due to a dangerously unfavorable balance of trade. As Lewis explains it:

The West had failed; it was inevitable that many eyes should turn to another part of the world, where a rival, totally different system of economic organization was being tried. Soviet Russia with all her difficulties, had been little affected by the crisis of capitalism. Her state-directed, state-operated economy seemed immune to the depression, and even the governments of the capitalist West... were trying to solve the crisis by increasing state intervention in economic matters. Turkey was soon to follow -- and surpass -- their example. 25

It was at this time, in early 1931, that Ataturk published his famous manifesto in which he set forth the six "fundamental and unchanging principles" (Six Arrows). Of these six principles, the only new one was etatism. It has been argued that the Turkish policy of etatism was Soviet inspired. Spokesmen for etatism denied any connection between them and the socialist. However, it remains that the first Turkish five-year plan introduced in 1933 "was no doubt inspired by the Russian precedent and was most certainly helped by the Russian lead and Russian advice."²⁶

Even during this period when Turkey had a treaty of friendship and neutrality with the Russians and the Russians were giving Turkey economic aid, the historical Turkish distrust of the Soviets was evident. During conversations with General Douglas MacArthur in 1934, Atatürk predicted a major war in Europe around 1940 in which Germany would occupy all of Europe except Great Britain and Russia. He also saw the real victors of the war as the Soviet Union. In his words:

We Turks, as Russia's close neighbor, and the nation which has fought more wars against her than any other country, are following closely the courses of events there, and see the danger stripped of all camouflage...The Bolsheviks have now reached a point at which they constitute the greatest threat not only to Europe but to all Asia. (Italics mine) 27

History was to prove him accurate time and time again, even to present day.

Turkish distrust of the Soviets and the trend of cooling relations between Ankara and Moscow during the 1930s was symbolized by the Saadabad Pact. In the 1920s and early 1930s relations between Turkey and Iran were strained. This estrangement was the result of various factors including the Kurdish uprisings which threatened the internal security of both countries. Iran and Iraq had similar disputes. However, these three countries met at Saadabad in 1937 and together with Afghanistan conclude a pact that provided for nonaggression, consultation, and mutual cooperation in stamping out subversive activities among the signatory states. For Turkey, it was also a reaction to rising Italian aggression. It was implicitly directed against the Kurds and Soviet infiltration of the area. According to Lenczowski, the Saadabad Pact "was viewed with thinly disguised hostility by Russia, who believed it to be another type of cordon sanitaire."²⁸

The Atatürk era came to an end with his death on November 10, 1938, but his legacies to the Turkish nation and its people lived on. Many of his contemporaries and writers, both past

and present, considered Atatürk a dictator. This point can be argued, but it remains clear that his one-party "benevolent dictatorship" was exactly what was required by the conditions of the time to prod the "Sick Man of Europe" from his death-bed and start him down the road of recovery. He was successful in transforming Turkey from a backward, traditional Middle Eastern country into one which was Western in orientation and rapidly modernizing. At the same time he was able to conduct a foreign policy which protected Turkey's internal policies from the pressures of the international system. Perhaps one of his greatest legacies was the ensured continuity of his government. At a time when the clouds of war were gathering over Europe, and political instability would have spelled doom for Turkey, İsmet İnönü followed Atatürk as president of the Turkish Republic without a break or interruption in the continuity of government.

C. THE İNÖNÜ ERA: 1938-1945

During this period of time (1938-1945) which includes World War II, Turkish foreign policy was one of neutrality. The content of that policy, with its consistencies and pragmatic shifts, was primarily the work of one man -- İsmet İnönü. As President of Turkey and leader of the party in a one-party political system, he controlled all the instruments of government. Just as it was during Atatürk's era, Turkish foreign policy ideology was dominated by the two principles of "peace, sovereignty and national development" and that "the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to Turkey's security."

Inönü, Atatürk's lifelong friend, closest collaborator and former prime minister inherited a "tranquil and loyal country."²⁹ And, considering the difficult times that lay ahead during World War II and the subsequent demand placed on İnönü by delicate foreign policy maneuverings, it is well that the Turkish domestic situation was relatively stable. That is not to say that all was well on the homefront. Indeed, Turkey's serious economic problems were to have a direct impact on her war-time policies. One of these, the infamous Varlık Vergisi (capital tax) would have a serious impact in Turkey and eventually contribute to İnönü's decline.

The clouds of war gathering over Europe in 1939 forced Turkey to reconsider her policy of non-alignment. Finally, when Fascist Italy, whom Turkey had considered a potential aggressor since the late 1920s, invaded Albania Turkey sought and entered into an alliance with France and Great Britain. A direct result of the negotiations which led to the pact with France was the settlement of the only question left over from Lausanne -- the disposition Iskenderun (Alexandretta). Anxious to conclude a treaty with Turkey, France ceded the Syrian district of Iskenderun to Turkey. The question of Iskenderun is still a cause for ill feelings between Syria and Turkey.

When Turkey entered into alliance agreements with France and Great Britain, she did so in the belief that the Soviet Union would soon follow suit. When the Soviets concluded an agreement with Germany in August 1939, a bare week before the

outbreak of World War II, Turkey, as well as the other European nations, was taken by surprise. After frantic but fruitless negotiations with Moscow, Turkey entered a Mutual Assistance Pact with Great Britain and France in October 1939. Under the terms of this tripartite pact, Turkey was obligated to enter the war only if it extended into the Mediterranean. Again, just as in the Balkan Pact, Turkey was exempt if the hostilities involved conflict with the Soviet Union.³⁰

Throughout the war, even when hostilities reached into the Mediterranean, Turkey was able to maintain her guarded neutrality. İnönü was convinced that if Turkey entered the War, the Soviets would occupy Turkey either as a member of the Axis or as a "liberator." He was determined not to give the Soviets an excuse to set foot on Turkish soil. İnönü foresaw the Soviet post-war domination of Eastern Europe, and according to Weisband, several times expressed a willingness to enter the war on the condition that a "coordinated Turkish-Anglo-American campaign in the Balkans and the Crimea, designed as much to establish a cordon sanitaire between Russia and Turkey as to defeat the Axis" could be agreed upon.³¹

Economic considerations and restraints greatly influenced Turkish wartime foreign policy.³² Due to the limited capacity and high production costs of Turkey's industry, until the time of the war, Turkey had found it more economically feasible to import finished products rather than to produce them domestically.

However, import shortages due to the war created inflation. Additionally, the wartime army (about two million men) resulted in heavy defense expenditures, which in turn accelerated the inflationary spiral.

Inönü's government introduced a series of domestic and external measures to combat this inflation. The external measures were effective, but the internal measures which consisted of various forms of repression were resented.

In January 1940 the Turkish government enacted the National Defense Law (Melle Korunma Kanunu) which allowed local officials to force peasants to work in "strategic industries," specifically the mines, at low wages. It also forced the farmers to sell their crops to the government at low prices. This was designed to decrease hoarding and lower prices, but it in fact increased hoarding and raised resentment -- resentment which would be felt when a multi-party system was introduced in 1945.

The capital tax (Varlık Vergisi) levy of November 1942 was designed to tax those who had accumulated wealth during the war, namely businessmen and owners of large farms. The arbitrary character of this tax and the way it was implemented undermined the citizen's confidence in the state and in the party. Furthermore, as a deflationary measure the capital tax was ineffective since the monies "which accrued as a result (of the tax) were never removed from circulation but reentered the money market immediately."³³

Turkey's external economic policies during World War II were not based on any alliance structure, but rather on a pragmatic policy dictated by her own needs and a desire to get the most for what she had to offer -- mainly chromite. In fact, it was not until April 1944 that Turkey, in an attempt to bring her foreign policy into closer alignment with emerging realities, stopped shipping chromite to Germany.

Turkey at last entered the war against Germany on February 23, 1945. This declaration of war was not the result of pressure exerted by the Allies. In fact, by this time Russia did not want Turkey in the war since it would qualify her for associate membership in the United Nations. Thus, Turkey had survived the Second World War virtually unscathed. Her wartime foreign policy remains one of history's best examples of "Small State diplomacy and Great Power politics."³⁴ However, Turkey was soon to learn that all her careful maneuvering to avoid alienating the Soviet Union had been to no avail.

CHAPTER II FOOTNOTES

¹Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 254.

²Ibid., pp. 244-245.

³Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 2:343-344.

⁴Ibid., pp. 2:340-372, and Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 237-256.

⁵Turkish National Commission for UNESCO, Atatürk, trans. Andrew J. Mango (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1963), p. 214.

⁶See Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 40-127, and Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

⁷From İctihad, 89 (Istanbul, 1329=1013), cited in Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 236.

⁸Rustow submits that the major political problems facing a modernizing society are; the growth of authority, the search for national identity, and the demand for political equalities. Concentrating on one problem at a time, Atatürk followed the sequence of most European countries. First, he established authority and then initiated the reforms to give Turkey a Western identity. Matters of social equality were left to later generations. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Modernization of Turkey," in Social Change and Politics in Turkey, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 113-114.

⁹See Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965) and Leslie L. and Noralou P. Loos, Managers of Modernization: Organizations and Elites in Turkey (1950-1969) (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).

¹⁰The basic reforms were: the abolition of the Sultanate (1922) and the Caliphate (1924), suppression of religious orders (1925), secularization of the law (1926), elimination of references to Islam as the religion of the State (1928), introduction of the Latin alphabet (1928), introduction of woman suffrage (1934), and introduction of family names (1935). See Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 256-293.

¹¹The six principles were formalized at the 1931 Congress of the RPP and written into the Turkish constitution in 1937. They are symbolized in the badge of the RPP as a fan composed of six arrows. Geoffrey Lewis, Modern Turkey, 4th ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1974), p. 121.

¹²Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 3-6.

¹³Rustow, "Modernization of Turkey," p. 112.

¹⁴Most of these bad memories were a result of the Ottoman Debt and the "capitulations: imposed by the European powers and Russia. See Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), pp. 229-303.

¹⁵Turkish National Commission for UNESCO, Atatürk, p. 200.

¹⁶Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 7.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 7-29.

¹⁸Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 25.

¹⁹Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 128-132 and 184.

²⁰For treatment of Turkey, the Straits and NATO, see especially, Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, and Ankara University Institute of International Relations, Turkey and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 43-46.

²¹For excellent histories and bibliographies of the Eastern Question and the Russo-Ottoman rivalry see Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey.

²²Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 2:358-359.

²³Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, p. 130.

²⁴Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 284.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 283.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 286.

²⁷Lord Kinross (J.P.D. Balfour), Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1965), p. 464.

²⁸Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, pp. 184, 660.

²⁹Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 294-295.

³⁰For the text of the treaty, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2 vols. (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 2:226-228.

³¹For an exhaustive account of Turkish war-time diplomacy, see Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945. For a shorter account see Harry N. Howard, Turkey, the Straits and U.S. Policy (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1974), pp. 161-209.

³²Most of the information discussed in this brief examination of Turkey's war-time economic policies can be found in Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, and Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 296-310.

³³Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, p. 95.

³⁴Ibid., Subtitle.

III. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S COLD WAR POLICIES:
1945-1960

The horse kicks out and the mule kicks
out; between the two the donkey dies. -
Turkish Proverb

He who eats his bread alone raises his
burden with his teeth alone. -
Turkish Proverb

World War II marked an important watershed not only in Turkey's foreign policy, but also in her domestic policies. It was no accident that significant changes occurred simultaneously in both foreign and domestic policies; for, as we shall see there was a definite linkage between the two.

Turkey's close alignment with the Western countries in the political and economic fields after the Second World War represented a significant reversal in her earlier policies. The Republic of Turkey established under Kemal Atatürk's leadership and guidance attempted to adopt the institutions and the values of the West in order to expedite the process of modernization and economic development. This policy of identification with the West did not, however, imply a dependence on the Western powers either militarily or economically. On the contrary, as discussed earlier, Turkish foreign policy before the Second World War was independent in nature and based primarily on a series of regional pacts. She maintained friendly relations with the Big Powers while avoiding any formal affiliation with any one of them until 1939. Her treaties of friendship with

the Soviet Union represented regionalism, not a desire for international or global involvement. Turkey's reluctance to form any economic bonds which might lead to any dependency -- real or imagined -- was clearly a reaction to the foreign domination of Turkey's economy in the 19th century. The memories of the concessions given by the various Sultans to foreigners and foreign operations in terms of extra territorial rights through the capitulations and the Foreign Debt Administration, which was established in Turkey after the Sultans had defaulted on their debts to European powers, were still vivid. Why then did Turkish foreign policy reverse itself following World War II? The answer to this question lies in the systemic and internal pressures which became dominant during this period.

A. THE DIE IS CAST

A number of factors in the international arena were instrumental in Turkey's decision to establish closer ties with the Western countries. After the Second World War, the structure of the international system rapidly evolved from a "balance-of-power" structure to a "bipolar" structure. Lines or frontiers were being drawn between the two adversaries -- the West, dominated by the United States; and the East, dominated by the Soviet Union. Since there was not yet a "Third World" during this early period of bipolarity, a policy of neutrality at this time was not very realistic for a country like Turkey, situated in such a geopolitically important area. This then --

the "bipolarity" of the international system -- was probably the most important factor in Turkey's shift from its neutral stance to a military alignment with the West.

The impetus for Turkey's shift to a Western alignment did not come from the West, but rather resulted from her reaction to Soviet pressures. As stated earlier one of the principles of Turkish foreign policy ideology was that the Soviet Union represented the primary threat to Turkey's sovereignty; and accordingly Turkish leaders were careful not to antagonize their giant neighbor. Indeed, until 1936-1939, Turkish foreign policy decisions likely to affect the Soviet Union were taken in consultation with the Soviets, and Turkish agreements with countries other than the Soviet Union -- such as the Balkan Pact of 1934 and the Tripartite Pact of 1939 -- usually contained provisions which exempt Turkey from hostilities involving the Soviets. The Saadabad Pact of 1937 was a notable exception. Nevertheless, after 1939 it became obvious to Turkey that the Soviets were pursuing a policy designed to isolate Turkey from the West in order to gain territorial concessions.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939 served notice to Turkey that the Soviets had not abandoned the expansionist ambitions of the Tzars. The German invasion of Russia in 1941 did little to abate Turkish apprehension. In 1943 the Soviets put pressure on the Allies to bring Turkey into the war, knowing full well that ill armed as she was, Turkey would be occupied by Germany and would probably have to be "liberated" by the Soviets. Yet

by 1944, when the defeat of Germany appeared certain, the Soviets opposed Turkish entry into the war; possibly in order to isolate and exclude her from participation in any post war settlement conference.¹

The question of the Turkish Straits was a topic of discussion at both the Yalta and Potsdam Conference.² At Potsdam the Soviets had sought to obtain an Allied consensus that the problem of the Straits was a matter between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Great Britain objected, while the United States agreed. Having already received a Soviet note on March 19, 1945 denouncing the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression and another note on June 7, 1945 demanding Soviet bases on the Straits in addition to the return of the eastern provinces of Kars and Ardahan, Turkey felt isolated and sought to change the American position.³ Although by the end of 1946 the Allied position had hardened in opposition to Soviet demands on Turkey, it was not until 1947, when in reaction to communist activities in Greece and the British announcement of their intention to withdraw from the area, that the United States became actively involved. The resulting Truman Doctrine forged the initial bonds between Turkey and the United States.⁴

Although the aggressive behavior of the Soviets forced Turkey towards the West, a second factor probably contributed to Turkey's willingness to alter her position of non-alignment and seek closer links with the West. The War had ended in a clear victory for the Western democracies, and the future seemed to be on their side and with their political system.

It was also probably significant to the Turks that the dominant Western nation, the United States, was geographically located a considerable distance from Turkey and had no history of colonial domination of lesser developed countries.

B. TURKEY'S WESTERN BONDS ARE FORMED

The aid agreement of the Truman Doctrine was ratified by a unanimous vote in the Turkish Assembly, but there was some dissent over the terms Washington sought. Congress had imposed restrictions on the use of American aid and directed the President to terminate the program if the recipient governments failed to meet these restrictions. And as Harris has noted: "If there was one sensitive nerve in the Turkish body politic, it was according privileges to foreigners. Supervision implied control; this in turn implied abandoning sovereignty."⁵ As a result the language of the agreement was softened while its substance was retained, and it was signed without further dissent.

Turkey soon established additional formal links with the Western community. In 1948 Turkey became a member of the newly established Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and in 1950 she joined the Council of Europe. Turkey's participation in these purely European organizations was of primary importance for her future economic and political relations and policies. Membership in OEEC automatically included Turkey in the Marshall Plan which was designed to provide American financial support for the economic recovery of Western

Europe. Albeit temporary, the success of the Marshall Plan was to have a significant impact on Turkey's domestic politics. This impact will be discussed later in this chapter.

Meanwhile, Turkey's main foreign policy objective was to be a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When NATO officially came into being in 1949 there was no provision for Turkish membership. Perhaps, as maintained by Harris, Turkey's desire for membership was based on concern that her exclusion might lead to a decrease of United States interest and a subsequent reduction in American aid. Whatever the reason, Turkey felt that membership in the Council of Europe, which she was belatedly invited to join in 1949, was a meager consolation for being left out of NATO. In no way did Turkey "consider the Council of Europe, which disposed neither economic nor military resources.... an acceptable substitute for NATO."⁶

The initial basis for Turkey's exclusion from NATO was geography. Additionally, Great Britain opposed Turkish membership in the Western alliance. The British wanted Turkey to stay out in order to be the cornerstone of an alliance in the Middle East. It is generally accepted that the Turkish decision to send troops to Korea gained Turkey the support necessary for her eventual acceptance into NATO in 1952.

C. THE DOMESTIC SCENE

On the domestic front, a dramatic change in the Turkish political system was occurring concurrently with her shift to the West. Between 1945 and 1950 a multi-party system replaced

the single-party rule of the Republican People's Party (RPP). Turkey's post-war foreign policy goals in part affected this change in her domestic politics which in turn had an effect on Turkish foreign policy.

There can be little doubt that İnönü's desire for Western support against Soviet demands strongly influenced his decision to promote truly democratic, multi-party elections. This was quite evident in that İnönü instructed his delegation to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco to announce Turkey's transition to a multi-party system.⁷ Additionally, the victory of the "democracies" in the Second World War had re-established their prestige after the depression of 1929 had discredited their capitalistic system. However, the real impetus for change was İnönü's accurate assessment of Turkey's domestic scene.

The social changes and specific events which culminated in the formation of a multi-party system in Turkey are too numerous and involved for the scope of this study.⁸ Some of these factors have already been mentioned and included resentment against the government's austere and restrictive wartime policies; the severe impact of the capital tax (Varlık Vergisi) on entrepreneurs and large land owners; activities of the Turkish communist;⁹ and the social mobilizing influence of Atatürk reforms.

Under the presidencies of Atatürk and İnönü, government policy-making had remained the almost exclusive privilege of the Republican People's Party (RPP) which represented an urban elite composed of former high ranking military officers and

bureaucrats. Now, in the words of Frey, "an alternative elite had developed...[and] an intense, personally salient democratic conviction had spread" over a large group of Turks.¹⁰ İnönü's own account of the multi-party system indicates that the decision to abandon his single-party rule was based on a need to ease social unrest among all groups.¹¹

Whatever the reason for its introduction, this political experiment offered the rural groups an opportunity to gain political influence and it enabled the masses to participate in public life through direct vote.

In 1950 the Democratic Party (DP) of Adnan Menderes won a decisive victory over İnönü's RPP. Thus, asserts Rustow, "İsmet İnönü retains the singular honor of being the world's only statesman who voluntarily abdicated his dictatorial powers so as to promote the introduction of democracy."¹²

Turkey's new DP government was at least just as anxious as the RPP to tie Turkey politically and economically to the West, and particularly to the United States. Turkey's economic system under the DP was modeled along Western lines and relied heavily on private initiative and foreign investment. Under the DP rule, which lasted until 1960 when it was ended by a military coup, Turkey came to rely heavily on foreign, mainly American, economic and military assistance. Thus, her need for foreign aid became an integral part of her foreign as well as domestic policy.

During the period 1947-1961 Turkey received \$1,862 million in military assistance and \$1,394 million in economic assistance from the United States.¹³ As a result of this more than \$3.25 billion in assistance Turkish leaders apparently became insulated from economic reality, and consequently established Turkey's long standing dependency on foreign assistance. After an impressive economic start which lasted through 1953 the economic situation in Turkey deteriorated rapidly. Its initial success was mainly due to the expansion of private investment, the boom in agricultural production as a result of price support, the mechanization of farming, and very favorable weather. Despite early indications and Western warnings of serious economic problems, Menderes, encouraged by early success, continued to pursue ambitious but uncoordinated development policies. After 1953, due to inadequate and haphazard planning, politically motivated programs, a shortage of capital, and inclement weather, Turkey's economy began to deteriorate and her foreign trade deficit soared.¹⁴

The United States continued to provide essential assistance eventhough the Turkish government refused to follow its economic advice. Although the United States refused to completely bail out Turkey's ailing economy, her continued aid fostered Turkey's sometimes exaggerated view of her political and geographical importance. Finally, when faced with bankruptcy in 1958, Menderes accepted the stabilization program imposed by

an international consortium composed of the United States, Germany, Great Britain and the European Payments Union and International Monetary Fund. In return the consortium re-scheduled Turkey's debts and provided an aid package of \$359 million.¹⁵ As a result, "the Turks were left with the reputation of being ever recalcitrant in the economic field and hence willing to conform to the wisdom of the world's economists only in extremis."¹⁶

In addition to establishing Turkey's dependency on foreign assistance and creating a less than favorable image of the Turk's ability to manage its finances, the fiscal policies of the DP government led to significant social changes in Turkey. The peasant emerged "as an important actor in the political arena."¹⁷ The increased correlation of status with power and the rise of a new middle class based on economic activity resulted in a concomitant decline in the status of the salaried bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers. "The Democratic Party government," states Karpat, "proved dangerously blind to the new forces developing in society."¹⁸ Thus, the stage was set for domestic conflict.

D. TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS: 1945-1960

Turkish-Soviet relations after World War II were strained due to Soviet territorial demands on Turkey. After 1946 their relations deteriorated proportionately to Turkey's alignment with the West through the Truman Doctrine (1947), her membership

in NATO (1952), and the Baghdad Pact (1955). Her transition to a multi-party political system based on free elections and an economic system centered on free enterprise also reflected Turkey's commitment to the West. All these actions resulted in sharp and often threatening notes from the Soviets which only served to move Turkey closer to her Western allies.¹⁹

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 made clear the American interest in protecting Turkey against Soviet encroachment and imparted a new confidence in Turkey. Whereas earlier Turkish leaders had been careful not to antagonize their powerful neighbor, they now became openly hostile towards the Soviets. This hostility was reflected in the bluntness of statements by Turkish leaders directed toward the Soviets, and the defiant tone of the Turkish press.²⁰

The Truman Doctrine also brought about a shift in the focus of Soviet foreign policy vis-a-vis Turkey. Moscow believed, quite correctly, that American involvement in Turkey was part of a grand design to encircle the Soviet Union. Therefore, the focus of Soviet attention shifted from the Straits and Soviet territorial claims to an attack against Turkey's American connection.²¹ The fear that Turkey might be used as a base for a Western attack against the Soviet Union would dictate Soviet policies toward Turkey for a long time.

Soviet policy toward Turkey remained openly hostile and intimidating until 1953 when a culmination of several factors

resulted in a change. Soviet hostility had been directly responsible for Turkey's suppression of the leftist parties and their organs during the 1940s.²² This suppression of the "left" was supported by both the RPP and DP, and left Moscow with little hope of seeing a friendly government in Turkey. In fact, the DP which won the 1950 elections was if anything more pro-West and anti-Soviet than the RPP. Turkey's entrance into NATO in 1952 solidified her Western alignment. It was under these circumstances that the Soviets, realizing the failure of their hardline policy, began their peace offensive in Turkey. In May 1953, barely three months after Stalin's death, the Soviet government renounced its territorial claims on Turkey's eastern provinces and its desire for control of the Straits.²³

The Soviet peace initiatives in Turkey which began in 1953 continued without visible results until 1960. The Turks regarded these peace moves as a new Soviet tactic designed to separate her from the West and treated them accordingly. Khrushchev's leap over the "northern tier" to establish intimate relations with Egypt in 1955, and the Syrian and Iraqi crises of 1957 and 1958 involved a fear in Turkey of being surrounded by hostile pro-Soviet states. Furthermore, the crushing of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 by the Red Army confirmed Turkish suspicions that Soviet peace moves were in word only.²⁴ This attitude began to change by the late 1950s.

Several factors combined to lead Menderes to accept Soviet peace probes in 1960. First of all, Moscow was no longer insisting on radical change in Turkish foreign policy as the price for improved relations -- Turkey could continue to honor her international commitments. Soviet offers of economic aid and additional favorable economic arrangements surely must have tempted the DP government since the \$359 million extended by the West in 1958 was all but gone. Finally, the Cold War had entered a period of limited detente in 1954 and Turkey was being left behind in the process of normalization of East-West relations.²⁵ These basic changes in the international system and Soviet policy, coupled with Turkey's need for economic assistance led to an agreement in April 1960 for an exchange of visits between Premiers Menderes and Krushchev. However, because Menderes was ousted by a military coup on May 27, 1960, Turkish-Soviet relations were to remain at a standstill for another four years.

It would be a mistake to examine Turkish Soviet without briefly analyzing Turkey's relations with the Balkan countries. During the years before the Second World War, Turkey was able to establish friendly relations with practically all the Balkan countries; first, by renouncing all claims to former Ottoman lands, even those inhabited by ethnic Turks; and second, by entering into a system of regional alliances. The Balkan Pact of 1934 brought together the status quo states -- i.e., Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Yugoslavia -- to contain the expansionist

aims of Bulgaria. The Balkan Pact was successful until World War II when Bulgaria made some territorial gains by siding with the Axis from 1941-1944.

After the war Rumania and Bulgaria fell into the Soviet sphere of influence and their foreign policies were literal extensions of Soviet policy. Bulgaria was particularly sympathetic with Soviet policy toward Turkey. Apparently following Stalin's suggestions, Bulgaria expelled some 154,000 ethnic Turks in an apparent attempt to disrupt the incipient economic development of Turkey.²⁶

Turkey and Greece tried to consolidate their weak positions in the Balkans by exploiting the Yugoslav-Soviet conflict. The result was the Balkan Defense Pact of 1954. However, when Yugoslavia improved its relations with the Soviets and Tito emerged as one of the leaders of the nonaligned bloc the Balkan Defense Pact lapsed.²⁷

E. TURKEY'S MIDDLE EASTERN RELATIONS

The dominant factor which conditioned Turkish-Arab relations after both World Wars was Turkey's Western orientation. This Western orientation led Turkey to adopt political, social, cultural and economic ideas from the West, and it eventually led Turkey into NATO. Additionally, historical experiences, i.e., the relationship between the rulers (Ottoman Turks) and the ruled (Arabs), surely colored the relations between Turkey and the newly independent Arab countries.

Since the Arab countries had very little independence before World War II, it may be stated that Turkish-Arab relations developed chiefly after world War II. Even the Saadabad Pact of 1937, concerned primarily the non-Arab countries of the Northern Tier. Turkey's only other significant dealings with the Arab World prior to World War II concerned the questions of Mosul and Alexandretta. As we have seen, both questions were settled between Turkey, Britain and France, not Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Yet, the question of Alexandretta is still today a matter of tension between Syria and Turkey.

Since they formally began after World War II, these factors, each having roots in Turkey's association with the West can be identified as having significant impact on Turkish Arab relations. First, Atatürk's reforms created a rift between the two Islamic peoples. The replacement of the Arabic script by the Latin, the purge of Arabic words from the Turkish language, the abolition of the Caliphate and the general secularization of Turkey in the name of modernization (Westernization) created profound resentment and mistrust among Arabs. Second, in her Middle Eastern dealings Turkey was looked upon by the Arabs as a pawn of the West. This perception was not all together untrue, but it would be unfair to assume that Turkey was acting only as a Western proxy. Indeed, Turkey had a real desire for secure southern borders. Third, the emergence of Israel had an immediate and long lasting effect on Turkish-Arab relations. Originally Turkey opposed the

partition of Palestine; but, after establishment of Israel, Turkey was the first Islamic nation to recognize her and exchange ambassadors.²⁸ Although Turkey's position in the Arab-Israeli dispute would change somewhat in the late 1960s, her friendly relations with Israel adversely affected Turkish-Arab relations in the 1950s.

Turkish foreign policy objectives in the Middle East mirrored her pro-Western alignment. This was clearly spelled out in a statement by then Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü. Following a meeting with the Secretary General of the Arab League who apparently advised Turkey against trying to organize a defense organization in the Middle East, Köprülü stated: "We believe that the defense of the Middle East is absolutely necessary for the economic and strategic defense of Europe. Consequently, after joining the Atlantic Pact, Turkey will perform in an effective fashion her role in the Middle East and will be ready to undertake the necessary common measures."²⁹

Turkey's initial efforts in 1951 to help establish a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) failed, but the idea behind it re-emerged later and ultimately resulted in the Baghdad Pact of 1955. Karpas assesses Turkey's diplomatic failures in the Middle East during the 1950s in terms of her failures to understand the trend of development and the political objectives of her Arab neighbors. He further contends that Turkish diplomacy in the Middle East was a continuation of her policy

during 1923-1945 "when she dealt with the problems of the area more through France and England than with the Arabs."³⁰

Western hopes for a MEDO comprised of Turkey, Egypt, France, Great Britain and the United States died with Egypt's flat refusal of membership in 1951. The events surrounding MEDO merely exacerbated relations between Turkey and her Arab neighbors, especially Egypt. An Egyptian periodical, Rozal-Yusuf published a cartoon which depicted Turkey's President, Celal Bayar, as a dog licking the boots of American, French and British representatives. Vigorous Turkish protest elicited an "apology" in the form of a second cartoon, in which the dog (Bayar) was now proudly erect and marching on a leash in front of the three Western representatives.³¹ The Muslim Brotherhood's newspaper al-da'wa went even further by labeling Turkey a "second Israel" and calling for her destruction.³¹ Such was the nature of Turkey's relations with Egypt during this period.

Despite the growing resentment of most of the Arab countries and over the objections at home by the RPP, the Menderes government continued to pursue Western policies in the Middle East. Finally, in 1955 the Baghdad Pact was concluded. The Pact which included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq and Great Britain was originally a British idea, but it later fit into the American "containment" strategy by linking NATO and the now defunct SEATO. Following Kassim's 1958 revolution in Iraq the Baghdad Pact's headquarters were moved to Ankara, and when Iraq withdrew in 1959 the Pact was re-named CENTO.

The effectiveness or utility of the Baghdad Pact can certainly be questioned; however, the role it played in the alienation of Egypt and her allies from the West in general and Turkey in particular are obvious. It probably precipitated the Arab countries' entente with the Soviet Union. It most assuredly cast Turkey in the image of a tool of the Western powers.

Meanwhile, Turkey's defense of the West at the Bandung Conference in 1955 further strained her relations with the Third World. At this conference of Afro-Asian nations Turkey strongly defended her Western Alliance (NATO) with blistering attacks on non-alignment, socialism and communism.³³ As a result Turkey became isolated from the Third World -- an isolation which would later be felt in the United Nations.

Throughout the 1950s Turkish foreign policy was clearly a product of her Western alignment and an extension of Western policies toward both the Soviet Union and the non-aligned nation. However, in the 1960s, due to systemic and internal changes as well as American policy toward Cyprus, Turkey began to re-evaluate her strict Western orientation.

CHAPTER III FOOTNOTES

¹For an excellent treatment of Turkish policies during World War II and Allied reaction, see Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945.

²Ibid., pp. 298-302, 317-318.

³Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 17-23.

⁴Ibid., pp. 25-28.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 38.

⁷Ibid., p. 16.

⁸Several studies deal specifically with Turkish politics during this period. See for example, Kemal H. Karpas, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, pp. 297-306; and Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 124-161.

⁹Gunther Nollau and Hans Jurgen Wiehe, Russia's Southern Flank (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 88-89.

¹⁰Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, p. 349.

¹¹For the text of İnönü's account, see Kemal H. Karpas, ed., Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 315-317.

¹²Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Modernization of Turkey in Historical and Comparative Perspective," in Kemal H. Karpas, ed., Social Change and Politics in Turkey (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 113.

¹³U.S. General Accounting Office, United States Economic Assistance to Turkey (Washington: GPO, 1974), p. 55.

¹⁴For Demirel's economic policies and problems, see Baran Tuncer, "External Financing of the Turkish Economy," in Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974, ed. Kemal H. Karpas (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975) pp. 212-213, and Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 31-35, 71-76.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 75.

¹⁷Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Elites and Modernization in Turkey," in Political Elites and Political Development in the Middle East, ed. Frank Tachau (New York: Schenkman-John Wiley, 1974), p. 43.

¹⁸Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, p. 301.

¹⁹Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations," in Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, pp. 83-84.

²⁰George S. Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey," in The Soviet Union and The Middle East, eds., Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974) pp. 29-30.

²¹Ibid.

²²Nollau and Wiehe, Russia's Southern Flank, pp. 88-89.

²³Text in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 1953, vol. 5. no. 29, pp. 21-22.

²⁴Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey," pp. 35-43.

²⁵For a brief treatment of the Khrushchev Detente, 1954, see Gerald L. Steibel, Detent: Promises and Pitfalls (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1975), pp. 7-9.

²⁶The economic, social and political impact of these immigrants is the subject of an excellent case study. See Arnold Leder, Catalysts of Change: Marxist versus Muslim in a Turkish Community (Austin: University of Texas Middle East Monograph, 1976).

²⁷Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, pp. 197-200.

²⁸Lewis, Modern Turkey, pp. 200-201.

²⁹Quoted in Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations," in Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition, p. 116.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Lewis, Modern Turkey, pp. 199-200.

³²Karpat, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations," p. 116.

³³Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 396. For the text of the speeches made at Bandung, see Documents on International Affairs, 1955 (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 397-438.

IV. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1960S: THE WESTERN TIES WEAKEN

An old friend is a mount for a black day. - Turkish Proverb

Let your ear hear what comes out of your mouth. - Turkish Proverb

The Turkish-American "love affair" which began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in the 1950s began to cool during the 1960s. Turks joined in the chorus of anti-American agitation with shouts of the familiar "Yankee Go Home." Along with the rise of anti-American sentiments in Turkey, a concomitant reorientation in Turkish foreign policy emerged. The Cyprus question stands out as being the most significant factor in bringing about the reappraisal and diversification of Turkish foreign policy during the 1960s. However, there were other factors both international and domestic involved in Turkey's policy shift.

A. THE DOMESTIC SCENE

While the 1964 Cyprus crisis is commonly regarded as the turning point in Turkish-American relations, in reality the process of reorientation in Turkish foreign started well before that year. As discussed in the preceeding chapter, the economic plight of Turkey in the late 1950s had led Menderes to consider rapprochement with the Soviets in order to obtain economic aid. In addition, the 1959 Bilateral Agreement between Turkey and the United States created unrest in Turkey's intellectual community and the Republican People's Party (RPP)-- the opposition

party.¹ This agreement which resulted from the Iraqi coup and the Lebanese crisis of 1958 stated that the United States would come to Turkey's aid in case of "direct or indirect aggression."² The opposition parties feared that the provision for American armed assistance in case of "indirect aggression" was a commitment to intervene on behalf of the Menderes government in the event of a coup or even an electoral defeat. This view was expressed by Bulent Ecevit, a spokesman for the RPP and a leading member of the intelligentsia, who drew a parallel between the agreement and American intervention in Lebanon, which was based on President Chamoun's invitation when he realized that he could not contain the internal opposition.³ Nevertheless, the Menderes regime was ousted by a military coup on May 27, 1960.

The 1960 coup was not based on any foreign policy consideration, but rather was a result of various social, economic and internal political factors.⁴ In fact, the military junta (National Union Committee - NUC) headed by General Cemal Gürsel emphasized in its first communique that the NUC regime would honor Turkey's foreign policy commitments.

We address ourselves to our allies, friends, neighbors and the entire world. Our aim is to remain completely loyal to the United Nation's Charter and to the principles of human rights. The principle of 'peace of home, peace in the world', set by the great Atatürk, is our flag. We are loyal to our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and are loyal to them.⁵

The only foreign policy modification affected by the NUC was an attempt to broaden the base of Turkey's foreign relations. The foreign policy section of the NUC's government program emphasized the need to improve relations with the Arab countries, especially the United Arab Republic and Iraq. Toward this end, Gürsel promised the Arabs that Turkey would support the Algerian cause.⁶ This support of the liberation movement in Algeria signalled Turkey's desire to establish closer contacts with the newly emerging nations.

Although the 1960 coup and the reign of the NUC did not produce any immediate real foreign policy changes, the relatively free political atmosphere after the coup and the new 1961 constitution had a significant impact on Turkish domestic politics, and subsequently impacted on Turkish foreign policy.

Under the presidencies of Atatürk and İnönü, and continuing throughout the 1950s under Menderes, Turkish foreign policy-making had remained the almost exclusive privilege of a small elitist group. Public criticism of government foreign policy was generally considered unpatriotic. The very nature of the single party politics of Atatürk and İnönü precluded any real opposition in the realm of foreign policy. Menderes and the DP, however, were faced with the opposition of the RPP. While it is evident that the RPP's views on foreign policy were very similar to those implemented by the DP government, Menderes did not consult with İnönü's party on matters of foreign policy. Under Menderes public discussion of foreign policy, and indeed

all other issues, were tightly controlled. For example, the decision to send Turkish troops to Korea, one of if not the most important Turkish foreign policy decision of the 1950s, was made by a small group, consisting of President Bayar, the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Commanders of the army. The opposition criticized this decision more on the way it was made than for its content. Menderes had consulted neither the opposition nor the Grand National Assembly (GNA), where he enjoyed overwhelming support.⁷ However, after the 1960 coup and the reconstruction of the constitutional government, Turkey's foreign relations entered inter-party discussions. There in lies perhaps the most lasting and positive achievement of the NUC.

Turkish politics, both foreign and domestic, have been greatly influenced by the constitutional and electoral changes introduced by the NUC. The 1924 constitution under which Menderes operated gave the unicameral parliament virtually unlimited powers. Furthermore, the electoral system gave the largest party a large parliamentary majority on the basis of a slim majority -- sometimes even a minority -- of the popular vote.⁸ The new Constitution -- drafted with the help of a special commission of experts and professors, and approved by a national referendum in July 1961 -- established a number of checks designed to provide a balance between the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as provide a viable role for a genuine opposition. Most notably, it made the GNA bicameral by

introducing an upper house and it established a Constitutional Court to rule on disputes concerning the constitution.⁹ The new electoral law introduced a system of proportional representation which radically altered the political scene by allowing small parties in far bigger parliamentary voice.

In affect, the increased importance afforded the smaller political parties after 1961 converted Turkey's political system from a two-party into a multi-party system. While it was true, and remains so today, that the RPP and the Justice Party (JP -- heir to the DP which was dissolved by the NUC in 1960) were the only large parties, the new electoral law made it increasingly more difficult for a single party to obtain a majority. Since 1961 only one party, Süleyman Demirel's JP, has successfully formed a majority government. The JP won an absolute majority in 1965 and increased its number of GNA seats in the general election of 1969. However, impelled partly by the inability of the government to cope with increasing civil disorder, and partly by the fear of a more radical army coup, Turkey's senior military leaders initiated a "coup by memorandum" in March, 1971. The memorandum presented to the Presidential threatened a military takeover unless a strong national government was formed which would end the anarchy and initiate economic and social reforms. Demirel resigned. What followed has been, just as in the period 1961-1965, a series of weak and generally ineffective coalition governments.¹⁰

The major ideological differences between Turkey's various political parties greatly influenced her domestic and foreign policy during the periods of coalition rule by creating an atmosphere within which a general consensus on policy was rarely reached. In addition, it seems to be a characteristics of Turkish politics that the party or parties not in power, rather than playing the role of a "loyal opposition," attempt to bring down the controlling party.

During the decade of rule by the Menderes government the Turkish public was generally quisscent on matters of foreign policy. This was due in part to the restrictive measures taken by Menderes, such as the Press Laws of 1954 and 1956, designed to silence criticism and limit opposition to his policies. However, following the 1960 coup, the succeeding Turkish governments allowed more latitude for political activities and public debate. The 1961 Constitution spelled out the "fundamental rights" -- freedom of thought and belief, freedom of the press, of publication, of association, and many others.¹² Foreign policy thus became a topic of open public debate.

These basic changes in Turkey's political life after 1961 outlined above led to speculation that a new foreign policy would soon emerge. However, as pointed out by Admad, Turkey's foreign policy remained essentially pragmatic.

Throughout the sixties there was an ambiguity between the foreign policy aspirations of the vocal and articulate

intelligentsia and the 'pragmatic' policies of the various governments. The intelligentsia was able to inhibit the activities of the government by constant criticism but it was never able to force the government to reformulate the policy.¹³

Another factor which was to contribute indirectly to a re-orientation of Turkey's foreign policy was the emergence for the first time in Turkey's history of a genuine socialist movement. This socialism was "both an ideology and technique of action designed to achieve rapid modernization through the national organization of economic life."¹⁴ The emergence of the new Turkish Left was marked by the publication of the weekly Yön (1961) and the establishment in 1962 of the Turkish Worker's Party (TWP) which was later outlawed after the 1971 coup.

The foreign policies advocated by both Yön and the TWP were a natural extension of their socialist ideology, i.e., the belief that a socialist movement could not be successful in Turkey so long as she maintained her close ties with the West and allowed a strong American presence on her soil. Thus, the socialist's demands centered on the abrogation of Turkey's treaties with the West and the normalization of relations with the neutral and communist countries.¹⁵

Although the new Left attracted many of its followers from the intelligentsia, its anti-American campaign did not attract any wide spread following until the Cyprus crisis of 1964. It was, however, at least in part responsible for a basic policy shift within the RPP. In what was apparently an attempt to gain support from the lower class (both rural and industrial)

and win back the intellectuals from the Worker's Party, İnönü's RPP adopted a "left of center" stance on the eve of the 1965 general elections. A year later Ecevit, the RPP member most closely associated with the new "left of center" strategy, was made the general-secretary of the party and in 1972 he became its leader.¹⁶

Another significant feature of the 1960s was the extraordinary degree of radicalism espoused by Turkish youth. The students had emerged as an important political force after the overthrow of Menderes, in which they had played a role. Early student radicalism was probably motivated by an exaggerated sense of importance of their role in the 1960 coup. In the late sixties it was undoubtedly affected by the world-wide trend, especially by the student insurrection in France in 1968. For whatever the reasons, student activities in Turkey assumed political significance, grew radical, and soon became polarized between the Right and the Left. Anti-imperialism was a common platform for both sides. But, while the students on the Left attacked Turkey's alliance with the West, which they believed restricted their country's freedom of action, those on the Right were virulently anti-communist and opposed Russian imperialism, which at that time was no longer an obvious threat to Turkey. Frequent armed clashes occurred and grew in intensity.

Economics continued to play an important role in Turkey's foreign policies. The military takeover in 1960 was a reaction,

at least in part to the mismanagement of the economy by Menderes. The NUC was well aware of the damage done by the short-sighted and uncoordinated economic policies of the previous government. Consequently it established a State Planning Organization and initiated the First Five Year Development Plan in 1963 (the original First Five Year Plan initiated by Atatürk in the 1930s did not get off the ground). It emphasized the importance of speeding up the rate of economic development. Economic planning placed a new emphasis on Turkey's requirements for external capital. In order to assure a steady flow of external financing for her development plans, Turkey applied for a NATO sponsored aid consortium. When NATO authorities refused, Turkey turned to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).¹⁸

The OECD Consortium for Turkey was established in July 1962 after strong American behind-the-scenes pressure. Turkey's desire for such a consortium were two-fold. First, it guaranteed a steady supply of external capital for development. Second, the Turks felt that a long-term commitment and combined effort by her allies was necessary to attain the goals set forth in the plan, and that linking their request for aid to the requirements of their new plan would result in more foreign assistance. The long-term commitment approach was later criticized by those who felt that it weakened Turkey's position to bargain for more assistance on better terms. There were

also those who argued that the consortium was a "step backward as far as Turkey's foreign policy was concerned because it invited a collective control over Turkey's economic policies reminiscent of the Ottoman Debt Administration of the past, and handicapped the pursuit of an independent policy."¹⁹

Turkey further linked her economic and political policies to the West through the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1959 Turkey applied for an associate status in the EEC. Her application was probably motivated more by political considerations than economic realities. Undoubtedly Turkey's desire to be considered "European" influenced her decision to seek ties with the EEC, but the fact that it followed so closely a similar request by Greece indicates that the Greek application prompted the Turkish action; for as Mehmet Birand writing in The World Today points out, "traditions of Turkish foreign policy required that Greece be watched very closely so that it would not use the political and economic weight resulting from a new relationship with Europe against Turkey."²⁰ Finally, in 1962, Turkey negotiated an agreement of association with the EEC.

Turkey's association with the EEC has not been free from controversy. Reflecting the close link between economic concerns and foreign policy objectives, Turkey's association with the EEC further polarized Turkey's political parties.²¹ In addition, preferences given by the EEC to former colonies and to several Mediterranean countries including Spain and Israel,

and the failure of the EEC to extend what Turkey considered sufficient credits led to charges of discrimination. These and other grievances which arose in the 1970s such as the free movement of Turkish workers in Europe and the EEC restrictions on Turkish textiles would "threaten to drive a dangerous wedge between Turkey and her Western allies."²²

B. CYPRUS IN THE 1960s

In terms of fostering a new direction for Turkish foreign policy, the foregoing factors involved only a limited circle of politicians and intellectuals until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964. The democratization of Turkish politics, with the growth of a vocal and fragmented opposition and the emergence of foreign policy as a political issue, created an atmosphere in which a shift to a more independent foreign policy was not only likely, but also considering Turkey's need for foreign capital, very probable. However, not until the Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 did the emerging independent policy trend at the top find wide popular support. Wide-spread anti-American sentiments emerged. But more importantly, events surrounding Cyprus forced Turkey's leaders to recognize that their strict adherence to a pro-Western alignment in a period of a changing international system had left Turkey virtually isolated in the World community. Cyprus then was the catalyst which forced Turkey to re-examine her foreign policy in the light of a rapidly changing world system.

A variety of forces combined to make the Cyprus issue one of vital importance for both the Turkish government and the Turkish people.²³ To begin with there was a large Turkish community on the island which the Turks felt compelled to defend against the Greek majority. Secondly, Turkey felt that a Greek-held Cyprus would represent a threat to the security of her southern waterways. Finally, enosis (union with Greece), the Greek position on the Cyprus issue, was seen by the Turks as a move toward the re-establishment of the old Byzantine Empire. Considering the history of conflict between Greece and Turkey, it is not surprising that the Cyprus issue became a highly emotional matter affecting national pride. Opposing enosis, Turkey favored either taksim (partition of the island) or a federated state.

In the 1950s the issue of enosis for Cyprus, which was a British colony, began to jeopardize relations between Turkey and Greece. Finally, in 1959 representatives from Greece, Turkey and Great Britain reached a compromise solution. Under the terms of this compromise Cyprus was to become an independent republic under a Greek Cypriot president and Turkish Cypriot vice-president, elected separately by their respective communities and both having veto powers. Under the terms of the agreement both enosis and taksim were specifically proscribed. Greece, Turkey and Great Britain were designated guarantee powers and charged with protecting the independence, territorial integrity and security of Cyprus. Under the terms of the 1960

Cypriot constitution, Greek and Turkish Cypriots would, on a proportional basis, share governmental, civil service, police and military functions. In fairness, it should be pointed out that the Turkish Cypriot role in these functions was greater than their percentage of the population which was 18-20 percent.²⁴

In late 1963 President Makarios proposed constitutional changes. His proposals, outlined in thirteen points, would have reduced the status of the Turkish community on the island from one of a community with equal rights to one of a minority subject to the will of the Greek majority.²⁵ These proposals were denounced vociferously by the Turkish government and were refused by the Turkish Cypriots who then withdrew from an active part in the governmental process. By the end of the year the two communities on Cyprus were at war with each other.

Turkey was drawn into the crisis. The Turkish Foreign Minister's formal statement protesting Makarios' earlier actions clearly illustrated the emotional and therefore the political appeal of the Cyprus crisis. The statement ended: "A Government that can abandon some 100,000 dear members of our race to the arbitrary administration of foreigners will never come to power in Turkey."²⁶ Clearly, the fragile Turkish coalition governments of the early 1960s could not dare negotiate a compromise.

Aware that unilateral action on her part might lead to condemnation, Turkey was forced to seek support for her position in NATO where the United States had the dominant voice. Turkey

fully expected American support; but the series of disillusionments that followed highlighted the Turks' faulty appraisal of the extent of support the United States could or would extend. In expecting American support Turkey had fail to take into account the changed circumstances in which the United States and her NATO allies were operating during the 1960s.²⁷ True, the United States had been instrumental in pressuring the Greeks to accept the 1959 Cyprus accords; but, by 1964, due to her association with the EEC, Greece was much less dependent on American aid, and therefore American economic leverage on Greece had greatly diminished.²⁸ Moreover, Makarios did not always follow the dictates from Athens.

Additionally, since 1959 American security needs, interest and general relationship with the nations involved in the Cyprus conflict had changed in accordance with changes in the international system and technological developments. The importance of Turkey's strategic location for American national security interest had diminished with the thaw in the Cold War and the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles. In fact, the short-range Jupiter missiles had been withdrawn from Turkey in 1962. Ulman also points out that American interests were colored by a large and well-organized Greek community in the United States "that automatically foreclosed a strongly pro-Turkish position on Cyprus."²⁹ His estimate of the Greek-American influence was to be proven very valid by the 1975

arms embargo on Turkey. Furthermore, the restrictions Turkey placed on the activities of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul were widely condemned by world Christianity.³⁰ All things considered, it is not surprising that the American and NATO position on Cyprus was one of neutrality between Greece and Turkey.

Thoroughly frustrated by American and NATO neutrality on Cyprus, isolated by the non-aligned nations and faced with public outcry at home, Inönü's government decided upon unilateral intervention and informed its allies. The American response was the now infamous Johnson letter of 1964 which warned that, should Turkey suffer a Soviet attack as a result of her armed intervention in Cyprus she could not expect support from NATO.³¹ Although the text of the Johnson letter and Inönü's reply were not made public until 1966, the contents were partially leaked to the press, and in the minds of many Turks confirmed what the radical intelligentsia had been saying about the Western Alliance -- namely that Turkey could not rely on its allies unconditionally. "From that time forth," notes Harris, "all Turkish governments would be on the defensive in regard to the American connection, and the memories of the Johnson letter would color popular impressions of the United States for many years to come."³²

With little pressure to do otherwise, Makarios rejected the NATO solution and took his case to the United Nations (UN),

where the non-aligned countries had the monopoly of votes. Here again Turkey was frustrated. In support of Makarios, the UN voted unanimously to send a peacekeeping force to Cyprus.³³ This vote and a subsequent UN vote on Cyprus in the summer of 1965 clearly demonstrated to Turkey the degree of her isolation in the world community. The 1965 vote which limited Turkish rights on the island was 47 for and 6 against with 54 abstentions. Apart from Turkey, those voting against the resolution were Iran and Pakistan (CENTO allies), Libya, Albania and the US, who many felt was trying to make amends for Johnson's letter. The abstention votes belonged to all the Eastern bloc countries and the other members of NATO. The votes for the resolution, especially those cast by the Afro-Asian countries, were a clear indication of the extent to which Turkey's Western policies had alienated the Third World.³⁴

C. TOWARD DIVERSIFICATION

The Cyprus crisis of 1963-1964 proved to be the catalyst which accelerated a trend that had evidenced itself in the late 1950s and early 1960s -- the Turkish government's desire to diversify its foreign policy. The need for a re-examination and diversification was brought about by a rapidly changing international system and Turkey's need for foreign economic aid. The relatively free political atmosphere and political fractionalization created by the 1961 Constitution intensified the need for a reappraisal of Turkish foreign policy. Before

reviewing the manifestations of Turkey's diversification in her foreign policy during the 1960s, it might be useful, as well as enlightening, to examine the views and opinions in Turkey during that time, since they undoubtedly formed the loose guidelines for her shift from total to limited reliance on the United States.

Due to various factors -- some of which have already been discussed, and others which shall be discussed later -- anti-American sentiment was growing in Turkey. However, it was probably the Turkish leader's perception of changing international environment and a real need for foreign aid that prompted a definite shift in Turkish foreign policy. Detente had begun to be thought of as an alternative to the East-West Cold War. America and the Soviet Union were no longer the enemies they were when Turkey joined NATO. Moscow, seeing that its hardline approach would not produce results, and feeling threatened by the growing power of the People's Republic of China, had become conciliatory. In Turkey, it was felt that there was a strong possibility that the European Community would emerge as a power bloc; and in a world dominated by four blocs -- the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Europe -- it was possible that the Americans and the Soviets would collaborate. Under these conditions Turkey's continued participation in NATO was a foregone conclusion.³⁴ At the same time there were strong proposals for a broader outlook in foreign relations.

Hamit Batu, a high ranking member of Turkey's Foreign Ministry, published an article in 1965 in which he agreed that Turkey must remain in NATO but at the same time readjust her foreign relations in conformity with changing international conditions. Batu proposed a stronger orientation towards Europe and although not explicitly stated, presumably away from dependence on the United States. Such a course, he argued, was dictated not only by Turkey's historical evolution toward the West, but also by the fact that if Turkey remained outside of Europe and Europe became a new power bloc, then Turkey's international position would be considerably weakened.

Batu pointed out that culturally, religiously and economically Turkey could not be considered European, but was rather included for geopolitical and strategic reasons. He submitted that Turkey, by establishing prestige in the Afro-Asian countries could become the bridge between East and West and thereby increase her worth in Europe. Turkey, he continued had long been alienated from the Afro-Asian bloc but must now reverse this trend. But, declared Batu, Turkey's Afro-Asian policy would only be a part of her greater European policy and she must therefore remain outside the neutral bloc. She could do this by supporting the Arabs at the UN; however, her policy toward the Afro-Asian countries outside of the UN must be one of "political non-intervention" to avoid the impression that she was running errands for others.³⁵

It would appear that these loose and somewhat ill-defined guidelines along with her search for foreign aid to meet rising domestic demands formed the basis of Turkey's foreign shift during the last half of the 1960s.³⁶

D. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1960S

Beyond the detrimental impact of the Cyprus crisis, other problems arising from the American presence in Turkey had a negative impact on Turkish-American relations. Compared to their British, French and Russian colleagues, Americans in Turkey lacked sufficient training in the Turkish culture and language. This coupled with their high standard of living and what the Turks considered to be American abuse of the "status of forces agreements" made them high profile targets for Turkey's radical groups. American sovereignty over military bases on Turkish soil and the alleged covert activities of the CIA were also favorite targets of anti-American criticism. However, it was not until 1964 and the Cyprus crisis that this anti-American sentiment gained wide-spread support.³⁷

In addition to the general areas of friction outlined above, two specific events which were to have an impact on Turkish-American relations took place during the 1960s -- the Cuban missile "deal" and NATO's adoption of the "flexible response" strategy. Although the two events probably did not arouse the general Turkish public, they surely created concern among Turkey's political and military leaders.

At the risk of further alienating the Soviets and making Turkey a prime target, the Menderes government had agreed to the deployment of medium range atomic warhead Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Therefore, it came as a shock and a slap in the face when in the fall of 1962 President Kennedy made a "deal" with Khrushchev to remove the Jupiters from Turkey in exchange for the Soviets removal of their missiles from Cuba. In point of fact, the Jupiter missiles had been rendered obsolete even before they became operational in July 1962. And, in 1961 the United States had begun negotiations with Turkey for their removal. For whatever the reason Turkish military leaders wanted to keep the missiles; and, as Harris points out, "the newly installed civilian government in Ankara was in no position to insist on withdrawing missiles over the opposition of the Turkish armed forces." As a result, the missiles were still in Turkey when the Cuban missile crisis brokeout and, presumably due to a time factor, a unilateral "deal" was made by Kennedy for their removal.³⁸

The removal of the Jupiters gave rise to several issues which would deeply impact Turkish-American relations. First of all, the suddenness with which the Cuban crisis occurred and the limelight which Turkey shared because of missiles on her soil brought about a basic change in Turkish attitudes. The experience had demonstrated that a war could occur almost without warning and the possession of strategic offensive weapons makes any country a primary target. Thus states Harris, "sentiment in Turkey thereafter began to rise in favor of removing

weapons systems which the Soviets considered especially dangerous, in order to decrease the likelihood that the country could be dragged into a conflict against her will."³⁹ Equally important was the impression given by Kennedy's unilateral action that during a crisis the United States could and would act in her own best interest without consideration of, or consultation with her allies. This, coupled with the strategy of "flexible response" and the doubt cast upon United States commitment to Turkey by the Johnson letter created great concern in Turkey.

Soviet development of thermonuclear weapons necessitated a rethinking of the concept of "massive retaliation," whereby an attack on an American ally would elicit an automatic nuclear strike against the aggressor. The United States opted for a strategy of "flexible response" which did not entail an automatic response.⁴⁰ In light of previous American actions surrounding Cuban and Cyprus, this new strategy doubtably created great concern in Turkey. The outcome of this concern was reappraisal by Turkey of her role in NATO.

In the aftermath of the 1967 Cyprus crisis, which this time was handled very diplomatically by Cyprus Vance, and the adoption of "flexible response" by NATO, the RPP commissioned a special panel to review Turkey's alliance with the United States and NATO. In a secret report submitted in the spring of 1968, the panel identified the following disadvantages to Turkey:

- The presence of United States and NATO nuclear bases makes Turkey a target for possible Soviet nuclear attack;
- The possibility exists that Turkey may be drawn into a war of no concern to her;
- There is doubt that NATO would operate to defend Turkey in the event of attack;
- Turkey's freedom of action is curtailed because of commitment of forces to NATO and because of United States control over the use of military equipment provided under aid agreements;
- There is exacerbation of relations with the Soviet Union and the Arab states because of participation in NATO.⁴¹

The panel recommended abrogation of agreements permitting the presence of an American intelligence network, repeal of all special concessions to United States forces in Turkey, elimination of strike bases, denuclearization of Turkey, and development of an independent national military force besides those committed to NATO. The panel's recommendations were not adopted at that time, but they were a clear indication of Turkish attitudes and a precursor of Turkish actions during and following the Cyprus crisis of 1974.

E. TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1960S

Following the 1964 Cyprus crisis Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union improved dramatically. This basic redirection of Turkish-Soviet relations was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during the Cyprus crisis. But, attempts by

Turkey to better its relations with the Communist nations were motivated by other factors as well. Turkey's desire for Soviet economic assistance in view of declining American economic and military aid;⁴² the development of a highly vocal political opposition; and the unprecedented anti-American sentiment in Turkey all contributed to Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

As indicated earlier, there had been a movement towards rapprochement with the Soviets as early as 1959, but the real thaw in Turkish-Soviet relations started with the visit of Feridun Cemal Erkin, the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister, to Moscow in late 1964. In his memoirs Erkin claims that Turkey moved to normalize relations with the Soviet Union because the Soviet threat to Turkey had decreased due to the NATO alliance, the rise of China as a balancing force, her economic difficulties on the domestic front, and demands for autonomy by the Soviet Union's allies in Eastern Europe.⁴³ Just as important were the signals from Moscow that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh policy toward Turkey and that better relations between the two countries would not be contingent on Turkey loosening her NATO bonds. Clearly, there were a variety of factors dictating the desirability for better relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, but just as clear is the fact that Cyprus was the catalyst for rapprochement.

Early talks between Turkey and the Soviet Union seem to have been restricted to Turkey's desire for support of her Cyprus position and the Soviet Union's desire to loosen Turkey's

Western ties and to pre-empt the Chinese who had seized upon the Cyprus crisis as an opportunity to better their relations with Turkey.⁴⁴ The Turks were apparently initially motivated by these basic consideration. First, they probably felt that signs of a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement would pressure the United States and NATO to induce the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept a solution favorable to Turkey. Second, Turkey hoped to win positive Soviet support for her position on Cyprus. Finally, the least they could expect was a neutral Soviet position, thereby denying support for the Greek position. By and large, the Turks achieved these objectives, with only minor concessions to the Soviets in the form of weakened ties to NATO such as their refusal to participate in the American sponsored multilateral nuclear force.⁴⁵

What began as a tactic to secure support for her position on Cyprus soon became a firm conviction of Turkish foreign policy. Even the Demirel government, which derived much of its strength from the mass of conservative Turkish peasants, traditionally the most anti-Soviet segment of Turkey's population, continued the Turkish policy of rapprochement which was begun under the İnönü government. Talks and visits between Turkey and the Soviet Union increased after 1965 and the dialogue was extended to other matters of mutual interest to the two countries. Perhaps most significant was the increase in trade and the beginning of a Soviet aid program for Turkey.⁴⁶ Turkish exports to the Soviet bloc rose by 132 percent between

1964 and 1967; imports from the Soviet bloc rose by 116 percent. This represented an increase of the Soviet bloc's share of Turkey's total trade from 7 percent in 1964 to 13 percent in 1967.⁴⁷

If Ankara had any apprehensions that its changing relations with the Soviet Union could jeopardize its position in NATO, they must have been dispelled by the Harmel Report entitled "The Future Tasks of the Alliance." This report, issued in late 1967, stated that since they are "sovereign states, the allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision.. [and] each ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problem and objectives of the other... Each ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to split the Alliance..."⁴⁸ Ironically, it was the Soviet Union not the West who unwillingly placed a damper on Turkish-Soviet relations.

A basic tenet of Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union was the belief that the Kremlin had abandoned their harsh, militaristic policy and would accept, however grudgingly, Turkey's membership in NATO. Therefore, the Soviets' armed repression of the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev doctrine claiming the right of intervention for the Soviets to uphold the socialist regime in any country must have had more than a sobering effect in Turkey. It was, according to Harris, "a blunt reminder that Moscow had

not renounced force where its vital interest were concerned."⁴⁹
The most immediate reaction to the Czech crisis was the decision of the Demirel regime, in a reversal of its previous position, to cooperate in a multilateral force to be created in the Mediterranean under NATO auspices.⁵⁰

The furor in Turkey over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia soon died out. Partly due to mounting pressure from the intelligentsia and the press for closer relations with the Soviet Union, but mostly in order to secure long-term trade agreements and economic aid for a series of industrial projects, the Turkish-Soviet dialogue was resumed in 1969.⁵¹

Although the Turkish-Soviet dialogue continued, two ominous developments outside the realm of diplomatic relations caused growing apprehension in Turkey. The first of these was the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and the other was the growing ideological impact of socialist doctrines within Turkey. These two developments were to impact on Turkey foreign and domestic policies of the 1970s in that the former again highlighted Turkey's strategic location, and the latter created instability in both the political and social life of Turkey.

F. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST, 1960S

Concomitant with her rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Turkey attempted to improve and expand her relations with the non-aligned countries, and especially those in the Middle East. The factors influencing this shift in Turkish foreign policy

were numerous and varied. Other than the obvious cultural, geographic and religious factors, the idea expressed by Batu that Turkey, for strategic political reasons, must become a bridge between East and West and the commercial opportunities in the new markets in the Arab countries undoubtedly influenced Turkey's leaders. However, Turkish-Arab relations in the 1960s were conditioned above all by the Cyprus dispute.

The nearly total lack of Third World support in the UN for the Turkish position on Cyprus, forced Turkey to realize that her policy toward the non-aligned nations in general and the Middle East in particular had isolated her from the rest of the world. As could be expected Turkey moved to break away from this isolation. Therefore, behind Turkey's new Arab policy was the desire to marshal support in the UN for her Cyprus stand, as well as to indicate to the United States that Turkish support on various issues could no longer be taken for granted.

Illustrative of Turkey's new independent policy in the Middle East was the diplomatic position taken by Turkey in the Arab-Israeli conflict. During the period following the 1964 Cyprus crisis up until the 1967 Arab-Israeli war; Ankara's position on the Middle East dispute was one of guarded neutrality. It was characterized by extreme caution designed to avoid antagonizing the United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations. In the aftermath of the war, the new independent direction of Turkey's foreign policy became evident in the UN. Mindful of

the importance of the thirteen potential Arab votes in the UN, as well as of future Communist support for her position on Cyprus, Turkey voted for the Yugoslov resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories. These same considerations prompted Turkey to abstain on the Latin American resolution calling for immediate Arab-Israeli negotiations. Yet at the same time, in an apparent attempt to balance its interests with the West, Turkey abstained on the Soviet resolution that labeled Israel an aggressor.⁵²

Another event manifesting the diversification of Turkey's foreign policy was the creation by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan of the Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD) -- an economic and cultural agreement parallel to but separate from the Western dominated CENTO. After the creation of RCD states Harris, "CENTO's importance visibly receded."⁵³

Initially, Ankara displayed little enthusiasm for RCD. "The Turks," observed The Economist, "stand in relation to the new community [RCD] rather like the British in Europe. For forty years they have been westward away from Asia. The most ardent heirs of Kemal Atatürk have no wish to see Turkey turn, or as they would say, turn back, towards Asia on the basis of Islam."⁵⁴ But Pakistan's proposal for RCD was timely in that it caught the Turks in the moment of their political isolation.

Thus, Turkey, whose credit with the non-aligned bloc had been bankrupt in 1964, began to pursue a more independent foreign policy in the Third World designed to alleviate the impression created at Bandung that she was running errands for the West.

CHAPTER IV FOOTNOTES

¹See Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 399, and A. H. Ulman and R. H. Dekmejian, "Changing Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1959-1967," Orbis, Fall 1967, pp. 773-774.

²For text, see New York Times, 6 March 1959.

³Cumhuriyet, 6 February 1960, cited in Ulman, "Changing Patterns," p. 774.

⁴The economic and social conditions which led to the 1960 coup were touched upon in chapter III. Furthermore, the repressive political measures of the DP government and the attempt to use the Army to put down opposition precipitated the coup. For a discussion of the reasons for the coup and the period of military rule, see Karpas, Social Change and Politics in Turkey, pp. 227-262, and Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, 1960-1961 (Brookings Institution, 1963).

⁵Middle East Record, 1960, London, n.d., p. 433, as cited in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 399.

⁶Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 400.

⁷Ibid., pp. 390-391.

⁸William M. Hale, "Modern Turkish Politics: an Historical Introduction," in Aspects of Modern Turkey, ed. William Hale (London: Bowker, 1976), p. 4.

⁹For the text of the 1960 Constitution see The Middle East Journal (Spring 1962), pp. 215-238.

¹⁰For political developments during the 1960s and early 1970s see, Andrew Mango, "Turkey: The Emergence of a Modern Problem," and Geoffrey Lewis, "Political Change in Turkey since 1960," both in Aspects of Modern Turkey, pp. 9-20. For a more indepth analysis see Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, pp. 147-389.

¹¹Ellen D. Ellis, "Post-Revolutionary Politics in Turkey," Current History, April 1962, pp. 223-224.

¹²For a summary of the new terms of the 1961 Constitution see Ibid., pp. 225-226.

¹³Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 401.

¹⁴Kemal H. Karpas, "Socialism and the Labor Party of Turkey," The Middle East Journal (April 1967), p. 157.

¹⁵Ulman, "Changing Patterns," p. 775.

¹⁶See Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 190, and David Barchard, "The Intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey in the 1960s," in Aspects of Modern Turkey, pp. 30-31.

¹⁷On student radicalism in Turkey see Barchard, "The intellectual Background to Radical Protest in Turkey," pp. 21-38; Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "Students and Politics in Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies (May 1970) pp. 150-162, and Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 128-131.

¹⁸Tuncer, "External Financing of the Turkish Economy," p. 214, and Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 100-101.

¹⁹Tuncer, "External Financing of the Turkish Economy," p. 214.

²⁰Mehmet Ali Birand, "Turkey and the European Community," The World Today, February 1978, p. 52.

²¹For the position of the various political parties on Turkey's association with the EEC see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 183-184, and Nuri Erin, Turkey, NATO and Europe: A Deteriorating Relationship? (Paris: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1977), pp. 9-10.

²²See Erin, Turkey, NATO and Europe, p. 29; Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 183-184; and Birand, "Turkey and the European Community," pp. 53-56.

²³Ulman, "Changing Patterns," p. 776.

²⁴For the main provisions of the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee and the 1960 Constitution see Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine, eds., Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: The New York Times Book Co., 1974), pp. 398-399; and Suat Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," in Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, pp. 135-155.

²⁵For a discussion of the "thirteen points" and related events, see Bilge, "The Cyprus Conflict and Turkey," pp. 157-165; and Thomas Trombetas, "The Republic of Cyprus: A Federation?" in The Cyprus Dilemma: Options for Peace (New York: Institute for Mediterranean Affairs, 1967), p. 12.

²⁶Ankara Radio, 13 August 1963, as cited in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 405.

²⁷Ulman, "Changing Patterns," pp. 776-777.

²⁸J. R. Lambert, "The EEC and the Mediterranean Area," The World Today, April 1965, pp. 163-165.

²⁹Ulman, "Changing Patterns," p. 777.

³⁰"Ousted Clerics Get U.S. Visas," New York Times,
4 May 1964.

³¹For the text of President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister İnönü and İnönü's reply see Ralph H. Magnus, ed., Documents on the Middle East (Washington; American Enterprise Institute, 1969), pp. 127-136.

³²These views were expressed in Fahir Armaoglu, "Bati Ittifakından Ayrılamayız," ("We Cannot Leave the Western Alliance"), Cumhuriyet, 29 April 1964, as cited in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 407n.

³³For a discussion of the "NATO solution" and the UN peace-keeping force see James M. Boyd, "Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping," International Organizations (Winter 1966), pp. 1-17; and Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, pp. 252-254.

³⁴UN Monthly Chronicle, 8 (August-September 1965), pp. 3-10.

³⁵Batu's article was published in Foreign Ministry Monthly (Ankara), March 1965 and translated and excerpted in Pulse (Ankara), 25 August 1965.

³⁶Cited in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, pp. 408.

³⁷For a discussion of the causes and the rise of anti-American sentiment in Turkey, see Ulman, "Changing Patterns," pp. 781-783; Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 57-60, 125-147; and Mehmet Gonlubol, "NATO and Turkey," in Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition, pp. 34-40.

³⁸For the background on the Jupiter missiles and the impact of their removal on Turkish-American relations, see Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 91-95; and Gunlubol, "NATO and Turkey," pp. 40-42.

³⁹Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 94.

⁴⁰"Massive retaliation" and "flexible response" as they apply to U.S. strategy in Europe are discussed in John M. Collins, Grand Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1963), pp. 110-140.

⁴¹Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 141-142.

⁴²Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 153-165, 173-182. Also see U.S. General Accounting Office, U.S. Economic Assistance to Turkey, September 1974.

⁴³Cited in Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations," p. 90.

⁴⁴For a summary of PRC-Turkish relations between 1964 and 1966 see "Peiping and Mideast," Chinese Communist Affairs: A Bimonthly Review (Speical Issue), December 1967, p. 33.

⁴⁵New York Times, 14 January 1965.

⁴⁶Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations," pp. 97-98.

⁴⁷International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade, a Supplement to International Financial Statistics (Washington: Annual) 1962-1966 and 1968.

⁴⁸Quoted in Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment, p. 409. Also see Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 158.

⁴⁹Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 53.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 53-54.

⁵¹Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations," pp. 97-98; and Harris, "The Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 54.

⁵²Ulman, "Changing Patterns," pp. 783-784; and Karpat, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations," pp. 124-131.

⁵³Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 70

⁵⁴The Economist, 15 August 1964.

V. ISSUES AND DETERMINANTS OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN
POLICY IN THE 1970S

The flood goes but the mud remains. -
Turkish Proverb

He that falls into the sea takes hold
of a serpent to be save. - Turkish Proverb

Turkey's foreign policy in the early 1970s was described by Turkish sources as "peaceful, constructive, multilateral, and consistent."¹ It was in fact a natural continuation of her 1960s' foreign policy which, influenced by the domestic and international factors outlined in the previous chapter, represented a shift from her strict Western alignment in favor of a more flexible and hopefully a more productive foreign policy. Turkey's foreign policy continued to be based on the principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic, and abstention from expansionism or interference in internal affairs of other nations. In short, it followed Atatürk's maxim of "Peace at home and peace abroad." But, as we shall see, in the 1970s, various factors both internal and external combined to make the following of this maxim increasingly more difficult.

The roots of many of these disruptive factors such as political instability, student violence and anti-American sentiments can be traced back to the 1960s. In fact, one factor which would greatly influence Turkish foreign policy options in the 1970s, namely a heavy dependence on foreign economic assistance, had its roots in the 1950s. However,

the 1970s contributed what was perhaps the most potent and devastating factor -- the Cyprus invasion and the subsequent American arms embargo on Turkey. This last factor intensified Turkey's political and economic problems and gave impetus to radical factions in Turkish society.

A. CYPRUS CRISIS OF 1974

The catalyst for change in Turkish foreign policy during the 1970s was again Cyprus. The 1974 Cyprus crisis served to intensify animosity between Greece and Turkey. It not only precipitated a sharp deterioration in relations between these two countries, but it also stretched Turkish-American relations to a near breaking point. The background to the crisis and the specific events that precipitated the Turkish invasion of Cyprus are too involved and varied to permit adequate description here.² However, a brief examination of some of the perceptions and motives of the various actors is necessary within the context of this study.

The coup against Makarios was apparently inspired by the Greek junta's need to find a foreign policy success abroad to offset their domestic weakness, and was based upon a total misreading of United States policy and the international situation. The colonels apparently felt that the United States, based on her tacit approval of their regime, would condone, or at least tolerate, the coup and restrain Turkey as she had in 1964 and 1967. But the circumstances in 1974 were different from those that had existed in those earlier years -- Turkish-American

relations had undergone a transition, and the United States no longer had the leverage on Turkey that she had in 1964 and 1967. Furthermore, detente and Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union had decreased the threat of Soviet intervention.

Within Turkey the situation was also quite different from that of the earlier Cyprus crises. The earlier crises had boosted the rising anti-Americanism and contributed to a polarization of domestic politics in Turkey. In turn, these forces contributed to increased political instability. Given the fact that it was not possible to argue that the Greek supported coup was an internal affair in which the guarantor powers --

Great Britain, Turkey and Greece -- had no legal right to intervene, Ecevit's weak coalition government had no viable option other than intervention.

The aftermath of Turkey's invasion of Cyprus is well-known. By the end of the summer of 1974, the Turkish army had occupied about 40 percent of Cyprus. In February 1975, the United States Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. Turkish-American relations reached their low, when later in 1975 the Turkish government suspended the activities at all American bases in Turkey except those related directly to NATO. It is important to note that the arms embargo was imposed by the Congress but opposed by the President, the State Department and the American military. This difference of opinion allowed the Turks to maintain their relations with the United States,

such as they were, and still save face. The embargo, which was partially lifted in late 1975, was fully lifted in the summer of 1978.

Aside from its impact of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-American relations, foreign reaction to the 1974 Cyprus invasion once again created a sense of diplomatic isolation in Turkey. The failure of her diplomatic efforts, began in the 1960s, to gain support among Arab and non-aligned countries for her policies in Cyprus was strikingly displayed at the 1976 Columbo Conference of non-aligned nations (as it had been at Lima in the previous year), while a UN General Assembly vote on a draft resolution on Cyprus in November 1976 showed 94-1 against Turkey, with 27 abstentions.³ Consequently, Turkey has redoubled her efforts to expand friendly relations with not only the Eastern Bloc countries, but also the Arab and non-aligned countries. This new direction in foreign policy must however, be viewed against the background of Turkey's internal political, social and economic problems.

B. DOMESTIC POLITICS

During the 1970s, a period which Frey describes as a state of "flux and transition" in the party system,⁴ two significant trends emerged in Turkey's electoral politics. First, the likelihood of a coalition government was greatly increased due to fragmentation in the party system. Secondly, this fragmentation has been accompanied by an increase in ideological

polarization. Since both of these trends directly influence the stability of Turkey's government, and thereby the conduct of her foreign policy, they require some examination.

The 1973 parliamentary election marked a turning point in Turkish electoral politics. For the first time, except for the 1961-1965 period when the autonomy of electoral politics was undermined and the party system was constrained by close military "supervision," a coalition government was necessitated by the failure of the dominant party to win a clear majority. In this election, the combined vote of the two major parties was only 63 percent and five smaller parties gained parliamentary seats.⁵

The reasons for the increase of fragmentation in the Turkish party system are varied. First, when the DP was disbanded by the military in 1960 a number of new parties emerged to seek the political loyalties of the former DP voters. Although the JP emerged as the heir apparent to the DP, the competition for the votes of the former Democrats continued into the 1970s. For example, in the 1973 elections, the newly formed Democratic Party, a splinter party of the JP, managed to gain 45 parliamentary seats by projecting the image of being the genuine heir of the defunct DP.⁶ Another explanation of the proliferation of political parties in Turkey is the new electoral law introduced in 1961 which, as discussed earlier, changed the electoral system from one based on a simple plurality to one of proportional representation. Finally, the rise of fragmentation can

be linked to the relative free political atmosphere introduced by the 1961 constitution. Earlier, the extreme Right and Left were systematically excluded from organized Turkish politics.⁷

When the legal restrictions were lifted in 1961, cleavages based on ideology and religion were introduced into the party system. In the 1965 elections for example, the extreme Right and the extreme Left were represented successfully by the newly formed National Action Party (NAP), a neo-Fascist party, and the Turkish Labor Party (TLP), a Marxist party; and, in 1973 the National Salvation Party (NSP) an ultra-Islamic party, was able to become a member of the coalition government.

Along with the rise of fragmentation in Turkey's political party system came an increase in political polarization. One could reasonably expect that a certain degree of pluralism in politics would have a moderating tendency. However, perhaps due to the extreme degree of fragmentation and the hostile, competitive nature of Turkish politics, Turkey's political parties became highly polarized. The main source of cleavage centers on the pro- and anti-Communist orientations displayed by the various parties. That is, although there are some definite differences between the parties on the Right, they all share a common anti-Communist view. Other than in the parties' view of Communism, this polarization of Turkish political life is reflected in a multiplicity of issues: economic (socialism versus capitalism), religious (secularism versus

an Islamic orientation), cultural (moderate versus violent nationalism), and foreign policy (Western versus Eastern versus Third World versus neutrality).

The net result of the increase in both party fragmentation and political polarization in Turkey has been a series of weak coalition governments. With little in common other than their shared anti-Communist view -- a view now moderated somewhat by rapprochement with the Soviet Union and disillusionment with the West -- the members of Turkey's various coalition governments have found it difficult to agree on any substantive foreign policy issues. This problem is well recognized by both Demirel and Ecevit. In reference to Turkey's foreign policy problems in 1977, Demirel said, "A stable government can solve them all. But... they [foreign policy issues] are readily turned into domestic policy issues and in coalitions the difference between small and big parties disappears. A party with five members can prevent you from taking a decision with a veto if those five members are needed."⁸ The desire to break away from the constraints of a coalition led Ecevit, who had ordered the invasion of Cyprus, to resign at the height of his popularity in September 1974. Apparently his aim was to force an early general election which probably would have restored him to power with a majority government. What followed, however, was a long governmental crisis which ended when Ecevit's former coalition partner, Necmettin Erbakan's NSP, joined the JP and Alparslan

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
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Türkes's NAP to form a new government in March 1975. Speaking in 1977, a RPP spokesman asserted, "If there had been elections in 1975, Cyprus would have ceased to be a problem today."⁹

The validity of this claim is open to debate, but one thing is certain: considering the polarization in his coalition and the emotional appeal of the Cyprus issue to the Turks, any concessions made by Demirel to solve the Cyprus question would have amounted to political suicide.

The 1977 parliamentary election offered some hope that the trend toward greater fragmentation in Turkey's party system has been reversed. The two major parties made substantial gains at the expense of the minor parties. However, until Demirel or Ecevit is able to solve Turkey's serious social and economic problems, thereby lessening the appeal of the radical parties, coalition governments with their inherent instability are likely to continue in Turkey.

C. POLITICAL VIOLENCE

The growth of factionalism in Turkish politics occurred against the backdrop of violent unrest in the large cities. The current political violence in Turkey had peaceful enough beginnings. However, what began in the late 1960s as peaceful student demonstrations against poor social and educational conditions was exploited by the extreme Left and soon became an ideological movement against the Demirel Government and Turkey's ties with the West. In 1969, as a reaction to the extreme Left, an extreme Right para-military organization was

established. The commandoes or "Grey Wolves" of this rightist organization are fanatically nationalistic and linked with Türkes's NAP. After the formation of the "Grey Wolves" says a Turkish Interior Ministry report, "student movements entered a new phase, turning into a bloody Left-Right-wing clash."¹⁰ Both sides in the conflict are deeply divided. On the right, the ultra-nationalistic "Grey Wolves" are challenged by the Islamic ideology of the Akıncılar, a youth group which supports the NPS. On the left, a multiplicity of groups all broadly adhering to Soviet Marxism face competition from extremely radical Maoist groups.

This violence which has cultural and religious as well as political roots has escalated in recent years. According to Ministry of the Interior figures published in The Middle East, the number of violent clashes rose from 159 (34 dead) in 1975 to 1,321 (215 dead) in 1977.¹² In the first half of 1978 the number killed in violent clashes had already surpassed the 1977 total.¹³ More important, the clashes have inspired violence outside of the Left versus Right arena. In April 1978 riots in the southeastern town of Malatya turned into an armed confrontation between the Sunni and Shia sects.¹⁴

The increase in political violence and terrorism in Turkey has led to speculation that the military might as it did in 1971, once again step in to restore order. This, according to many qualified observers, is the aim of the rightwing extremist. The Leftist on the other hand, are viewed as employing acts of

terrorism and anarchy to bring about a Marxist revolution.¹⁵ Whatever the reasons for this increase in political terrorism, the government must find a way to deal with it. The social and political instability generated by political violence seriously damages Turkey's world image at a time when Turkey is in great need of economic and political support. Additionally, a shift in balance to either side of the political spectrum could in turn affect the future directions of Turkey's foreign policy.

D. THE ARMY'S ROLE

Since the 1960 coup and the subsequent politicization of the armed forces, Turkey's army has played an important role in Turkish politics. After 1960 there was no doubt that the army, which sees itself as the guardian of the Turkish Republic and the instrument of Atatürk's social reforms, was the real power behind the government. Therefore, following the coup, the previously ceremonial position of president in Turkey took on an added importance as the President became the mediator between the army and the political parties. The extent of the army's power was evident in 1971 when their "coup by memorandum" forced Demirel's resignation -- a coup deemed necessary because of political violence, social unrest and economic difficulties.¹⁶ But two events in 1973 appreciably affected the power and prestige of the army.

The first was the presidential election in 1973. In the past the army's nominee had been accepted almost passively; on

this occasion the politicians reacted vigorously. In the process, the four main parties (the JP, the RPP, the Reliance Party and the new Democratic Party) united -- in itself a remarkable feat -- and the army's nominee, General Gürter, Chief of Staff, was rejected. Eventually, a compromise candidate, Admiral Korutürk was elected. This civilian challenge of the military was a novelty in Turkey and, although it ended in a compromise, was a clear political defeat for the army.

The second incident followed the first by only four months: the Supreme Military Council announced the retirement or "relocation" of 35 generals, many of whom were known for their "interventionist" views. The most important of these was General Batur, Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force. His departure meant that all four commanders who had issued the memorandum of 12 March 1971 had gone. This move was generally interpreted as a sign that the army was being effectively "depoliticised," a view which seemed to be sustained in October 1973 when the army made no attempt to interfere in the general elections.¹⁷

The 1973 incidents should not, however, be interpreted as a change in the army's role as the guardian of the constitution and the champion of Atatürk's reforms. It is still the power behind whichever government is in power. Although now reluctant to intervene in the democratic process without giving the politicians every chance to make good, the army will step in to prevent a radical shift to either the right or the left.

This position was made clear by the Chief of Staff, General Sancar's public message during Demirel's attempt to form a government in July 1977. In the message which was a warning to the politicians as well as a caution to members of the military, he said:

The Turkish Armed Forces consider it useful for everybody to know that they are closely following -- with the authority granted them by the law -- all the work being conducted to form a republican government since the beginning. The Turkish Armed Forces are proud and honored to inform the noble Turkish nation that they are determined to maintain their exemplary stand toward protecting our democracy... We consider it useful to announce to the noble Turkish nation that the Turkish Armed Forces -- which are the sole guarantor of the Turkish Republic and our democracy -- will never favor adventurists and will always oppose illegal activities... Turkish Armed Forces, whose duty is to defend the country, should not be occupied by such issues. 18

By virtue of its role in the political life of Turkey, the Turkish army's foreign policy orientation takes on an added significance. Prior to the 1974 Cyprus crisis and the American arms embargo, there was no question that the Turkish Armed Forces held very pro-NATO and American sentiments. But, in an army whose capabilities have been reduced by an estimated 50 percent because of the American restrictions,¹⁹ one would probably be hard pressed to find any strong pro-American sentiment. However, while her politicians can talk of non-alignment and neutrality, Turkey's military leaders realize that her strategic location leaves her no options except NATO

or the Soviet Bloc. Therefore, all things considered, the army will probably remain committed to NATO. This is especially true now that the arms embargo has been lifted.

E. ECONOMICS

Economic factors played an important role in influencing the course of Turkish policy in the 1970s and will in all likelihood continue to do so in the coming years. In a series of Five Year Plans, Turkey has committed herself to massive economic modernization. At the same time, for reasons related to her NATO alliance and her rivalry with Greece, Turkey has been compelled to maintain a high degree of military preparedness in the Eastern Mediterranean. In recent years economic trends both within Turkey and in the international arena have made balancing of these objectives increasingly more difficult. Turkey's economic growth rate in the 1970s was relatively high, averaging between 7 and 8 percent annually. But this high rate of growth was achieved at the expense of massive imports without any significant increase in exports, and was financed by heavy foreign loans.²⁰ At the same time high unemployment and inflation have become endemic to Turkey and are increasing. The high rate of unemployment (estimated at 20 percent in 1977) coupled with a birth rate of 2.4 percent which dumps nearly 1 million people on the labor market each year led one observer to write: "Unemployment and the high birth rate constitute Turkey's biggest and potentially most explosive problem."²¹

Turkey's economic difficulties have been heightened and complicated in recent years by her own policies as well as world events. Within Turkey, the economic policies of Demirel's government have drawn sharp criticism. His critics point out that Turkey has borrowed more money, at higher interest rates than ever before. Some worry that he has saddled the country with an enormous payment problem, while others accuse him of mortgaging Turkey's independence to the international bankers. Demirel retorts that Turkey must borrow in order to grow, and that future profits will pay off the loans. He further argues that economic growth is the only way to satisfy rising expectations and preserve domestic tranquility.²² Demirel's political rival, the RPP, charged him with running an "election economy" in which national interests were sacrificed for small political gains. There is some support for this last allegation. For example, in 1975 Demirel's government set the cotton price high enough to satisfy the farmers, but then was unable to sell the crop abroad because of the high price.²³ However, it would be unfair to blame Turkey's economic woes solely on her domestic policies. Certain international events in recent years such as the economic recession in Europe, the world-wide energy crisis and the 1974 Cyprus crisis, along with its repercussions, all adversely affected Turkey's economy and forced her to diversify her foreign policy.

Turkey's balance of trade and foreign currency reserve were effected by the recession in Europe. Her trade deficit with the EEC, her main trading partner, rose from less than half a billion in 1973 to an estimated 1.9 billion in 1977. At the same time remittances from Turks working in Europe, Turkey's only self generated source of income other than exports, dropped off significantly.²⁴ These setbacks were further compounded by the world-wide energy crisis which was touched off by the 1973 Arab oil embargo. According to 1978 estimates, Turkey imports 15 million tons of the 17.5 million tons she uses annually (86 percent). The cost of oil imports equals Turkey's entire export earnings.²⁵

A dramatic rise in military defense expenditures following the 1974 Cyprus invasion has severely strained Turkey's economy. The American arms embargo, the intervention in Cyprus and the present arms race with Greece required high defense spending. Henceforth aimed at self-sufficiency, Turkey's defense budget rose to over \$2 billion in 1975, compared with \$880 million in 1974; an expenditure of 2.6 billion was reached in 1977.²⁶ This continuing high defense expenditure has competed for scarce domestic resources.

These factors outlined above have increased Turkey's balance of payment problems and made the need to obtain outside credits and loans all the more pressing. In conditions reminiscent of the Ottoman Debt days Turkey faces a \$2.9 billion payments deficit, a \$4 billion trade gap and a scheduled repayment in

1978 of \$7.8 billion of short-term loans. With foreign currency reserves of less than \$1 billion and faced with a long list of austerity measures as requirements for future loans from the International Monetary Fund it is not surprising that Turkey has been searching desperately to expand her foreign relations to include the Soviet Union and the oil rich Arabs.²⁷

During the 1970s, Turkish-EEC relations continued to be strained. Most of the controversy centered around the EEC's reappraisal of strategic and military factors and political options in the wake of the Third World countries' raw materials revolution. In the new economic order, Turkey no longer enjoyed priority over Third World countries. Her failure to gain new agricultural concessions and the restrictions imposed on her textile exports disappointed Turkey and created dark suspicions of the Community's attitude and motives. Coupled with the increasing deficit in Turkey's trade balance with the EEC, these factors led to accusations that the EEC was responsible for Turkey's economic problems.²⁸ Additionally, the probability of Greek accession to the EEC led to worries in Turkey that the unanimous voting rule in the EEC Council of Ministers might be used by the Greeks to block pro-Turkish EEC initiatives. Turkey's preoccupation with Greece was evidenced by Ecevit's request to the EEC in 1978 for more trade concessions to compensate for the advantages Greece would gain from joining the EEC.²⁹ Considering, the state of Turkey's economy, the projected 1995 date for Turkish accession to the

EEC appears overly optimistic; but, Turkey's foreign policy orientations will undoubtedly be influenced by the character of her ties with the EEC in the coming years.

F. THE AEGEAN SEA ISSUE

Relations between Turkey and Greece, badly deteriorated over Cyprus, took a new and perilous turn for the worse in 1976 because of disputed claims to mineral rights in the Aegean Sea. The controversy actually started in 1973 when Greek operations struck oil in important commercial quantities. Immediate claims of mineral rights based on the their continental shelves were made by both countries. The problem is that the Greeks, based on their Aegean islands, and the Turks are claiming the same continental shelf.³⁰ In point of fact, Turkey's reaction in the 1974 Cyprus conflict might have been influenced by the Aegean controversy, since a show of weakness on Cyprus might have weakened her position in the Aegean Sea dispute.

In recent years, Greece has armed many of the islands -- in violation of international treaties -- and justifies this step by asserting that Turkey may eventually make territorial claims to the islands themselves.³¹ In reaction, the Turks established an "Aegean Army" "to discourage the Greeks from attacking Turkey from their Coastal islands."³² Meanwhile, Greece continues to assert the right to claim a twelve mile territorial limit around her islands. Turkey has warned repeatedly that such an act would be cause for war since it

would take away three of Turkey's five outlets to open Aegean waters and effectively turn the Aegean Sea into a Greek lake.³³

Obviously, the stakes in the Aegean are high; oil in large amounts could signal an era of unparalleled affluence for Greece or Turkey. Thus, while the impasse over Cyprus continues to draw headlines, in the long run issues on the Aegean Sea may be potentially more dangerous for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the Turkish Foreign Minister, Gündüz Ökcüm remarked in January 1978: "The most important question between us and Greece is the Aegean. Turkey's national interests in the Aegean are of economic and political nature, but they are also closely concerned with our security."³⁴

G. NEW ORIENTATIONS

In the 1970s, Turkish foreign policy changed its structure but not its foundations. While it still rests upon the principles of identification and alliance with the West, it is now marked by a trend which stresses the pursuit of Turkey's national interests in her foreign relations and greater independence in decision making. This new orientation was influenced by psychological factors introduced in the 1960s such as the reversal of the intimidating Soviet attitude towards Turkey; the Cuban crisis and the subsequent removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey; the American attitude towards the 1964 and 1967 Cyprus crises; the formation of the EEC; NATO's adoption of the "flexible response" strategy; and the lack of support in

the UN for her Cyprus policy. These psychological factors were exacerbated by the 1973 Middle East War and the ensuing oil crisis; a sharp deterioration in relations between Turkey and the United States, first on the poppy question and then on Cyprus; the tension between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus and Aegean problems; Turkey's differences with the EEC; and again, lack of support in the UN for Turkey's Cyprus policy.

These significant international events paralleled domestic developments in Turkey. Increases in communication, education and social as well as physical mobility led to higher expectations and greater politicalization of the Turkish people. In turn, these factors, together with the factors discussed earlier resulted in ideological polarization and party fragmentation. As we have seen the net result has been a series of coalition governments. Constrained by differences within their coalitions, Turkey's governments of the mid-1970s proved ineffective in the field of foreign relations. Thus, at a time when international political and economic imperatives called for solutions to Turkey's outstanding foreign policy problems, such as Cyprus, the Aegean and her relationship with the EEC, Turkey did not have a government with enough political prestige to make the compromises necessary for a lasting settlement to these problems.

On the other hand, the insistence on a more autonomous Turkish foreign policy from both the Right and the Left was

strengthened by the international events outlined above -- particularly the energy crisis which has had a devastating effect on Turkey; and the arms embargo which brought into question Turkey's Western defense alliance. Therefore, while little or no progress has been made on the Cyprus and Aegean issues, Turkey has exhibited strong moves toward developing good political and economic relations with the non-aligned countries, particularly those in the Middle East and the Balkans, and the Soviet Bloc countries.

The anti-Americanism which had emerged in the late 1960s became virulent by 1970. So intimately was Prime Minister Demirel identified with the United States that he no longer had the prestige to curb the rising political violence in Turkey. In the end, the military intervened on 12 March 1971 to cope with the political and social situations that Demirel had found impossible to resolve.³⁵

One immediate consequence of the military intervention was that Turkish foreign policy, as was the case with domestic policy, became "above party," free from the obstructionism of the political parties. However, the foreign policy section of Erim's military sponsored government program did not reflect a departure from the programs of earlier governments. Stressing that its foundation rested firmly upon the principles of Atatürk, Erim's government reaffirmed Turkey's commitment to the West:

The basis of [Turkey's] foreign policy will be the facts outlined by Atatürk... Our relations will be expanded with such international organizations as the UN, the Council of Europe, and the European Economic Community.

Regarding NATO, it said, "NATO is a defense organization that constitutes the soundest external guarantee of our security." The program went on to describe Turkey's close relationship with the United States and her cautious rapprochement with the Soviet Union:

...We are bound to the United States by ties of close friendship and alliance based on mutual respect and understanding. The fact that from time to time we view certain problems from different points must be regarded as a natural expression of friendship based on a reciprocal understanding and frankness between our countries . This is the proof of the soundness of this friendship, and a requirement of the political philosophy of the Western world, to which both Turkey and the United States belong. In line without traditional policy we can see the possibility of further development along the course of confidence in our relations with our great northern neighbor the USSR, in accordance with neighborliness and the spirit of the 1921 Moscow agreement, and based on the principles of independence, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

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The period between 12 March 1971 and the 1973 general elections was a period of relative calm in Turkish foreign policy. The military sponsored governments of this period attempted nothing controversial except the ban on poppy cultivation,³⁷ and perhaps the recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC).³⁸ Recognition of the PRC demonstrated the effectiveness of Erim's "above party" government, since a

government dependent on votes in the GNA would probably have found this decision a difficult one to take. Furthermore, the timing of the decision, which coincided with the thaw in Sino-American relations following Kissinger's visit to Peking, suggest a continued linkage between Turkey's American ties and her foreign policy. The Turkish government was quick however to deny press speculation that there had been American influence or pressure on Turkey's decision.³⁹

Whereas the recognition of the PRC did not incite much controversy, the poppy ban certainly did. In response to American pressure, which included threats of sanctions and reduction of aid to Turkey, Ankara agreed to prohibit the cultivation of the opium poppy after the 1972 crop. In return the United States agreed to provide \$35 million to compensate the poppy farmers. The poppy ban was an economic disaster for the growers, for as Harris has written, "Poppy planters earned far more from this crop -- even selling it legally to the state -- than they could expect from other produce grown on their land; hence to restrict or abolish the crop would be an economic blow to the traditional producers."⁴⁰ Public reaction was one of shame and dismay: most Turks believed that the government had succumbed to United States pressure and bribery. Thus, in Turkey as a whole, the government's poppy ban was very unpopular and added fuel to the flames of anti-Americanism. All the political parties promised to overturn the poppy decision if they were elected to power in the 1973 general election.⁴¹

As Ahmad writes, "The question was viewed not merely as a matter of restoring the cultivator's right to grow opium poppies, but of regaining Turkey's right to exercise autonomy... and restoring the independence, dignity, and prestige of Turkey."⁴²

Bülent Ecevit won the 1973 election, and from his earlier pronouncements it was clear that his government would attempt to exercise more independence in its foreign relations. There was no question of Turkey abandoning her alliances such as NATO and CENTO, but within the alliances Turkey would pursue a policy designed to serve her national interests and not those of others. That, according to Ecevit, was to be the difference between his foreign policy and that of his predecessors.⁴³ Thus, on the eve of the world wide energy crisis and the Cyprus invasion, with all its ramifications, the stage had already been set for new orientations in Turkish foreign policy.

The emergence of diversification in Turkey's foreign relations coincides with Ecevit's rise to power in the RPP. His political philosophy, which is quite similar to that of the European "social democrats," is most closely associated with pursuit of national interests and independence on foreign policy decision making.⁴⁴ Therefore, a look at the foreign policy section of his 1978 government programs offers some useful insights into the development of Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s and provides clues for determining the future of Turkey's external relations.

The effects of the American arms embargo and what the Turks viewed as the failure of NATO in regional conflict such as Cyprus are readily apparent in Ecevit's program:

Turkey, who is located in one of the most sensitive areas of the world, cannot keep her national defense dependent on the decision or indecision of other countries.

Turkey, who for years has been making contributions far above her economic resources to the joint defense system of which she is a member, has been left in recent years in a state where she finds it difficult to buy from her allies with her own money the defense equipment she needs.

This bitter experience has proved the setbacks of basing our national defense on external sources, especially on a single source, beyond a limit.

Consequently, the government program while, keeping "in view the importance of [Turkey's] alliance membership," gives top priority to "the elaboration of a national security concept in keeping with Turkey's needs and resources."

A novel feature of Ecevit's program is its emphasis on regionalism -- an emphasis reminiscent of Atatürk's era. Stating that the government "will make use of, as a lasting factor, the importance of its historic and geographic location as a Middle East, Mediterranean and Balkan country," the program promises, "without any discrimination from the viewpoint of domestic order," to:

...follow a dynamic foreign policy which is mindful of a just balance among the interests of nations, primarily those of the countries of the region and our frontier neighbors.

...manifest constant care to prevent [Turkey's] contribution to alliances from being a source of anxiety and distrust for the countries of the region.

...establish close relations, cooperation and solidarity with the countries of the region.

...support the countries of the region to engage in multilateral and constant cooperation in order to develop stronger economies based on larger markets, to accelerate their development and to save them from exploitation.

Attesting to the impact of economic considerations on foreign policy, the program points out that the strength derived "from regional economic cooperation" will allow Turkey to "seek ways of cooperating with technologically advanced countries without casting a shadow on [her] independence or freedom to decide." Along this line it promises to revise Turkey's "relations with the EEC in a way to function in favor of our country and economy" and gain "for the Turkish economy a structure which will not be crushed in its relations with the Common Market and which will strengthen Turkey's independence."

Regarding the Third World, Ecevit's government promises to "oppose imperialism with all her might, no matter where or under what guise it may continue to exist," and work "for the foundation of a just economic order in the world."

On Turkish-Greek relations, the government program remains steadfast on the Cyprus question, but hints at flexibility in the Aegean. It reiterates the stand of previous governments

on Cyprus which is based on "a bizonal, bicomunal, independent and non-aligned State formula." Concerning the Aegean dispute, Ecevit's program promises to "safeguard and defend national economic rights and all sovereignty rights on Turkey's continental shelf," but states that it will "make the necessary legal re-adjustments in accordance with the requirements of the age."⁴⁵

Clearly, the foreign policy objectives outlined in Ecevit's 1978 government program -- a program which on most major issues parallels Demirel's 1977 program⁴⁶ -- reflects a dramatic shift from Turkey's earlier policies. In the 1950s and to a lesser but still visible extent in the 1960s Turkey's security and economic policies reflected her close alignment with the West, especially the United States. In most cases, Turkey adhered to her Western orientation with little regard as to its adverse impact on her relations with countries of the region or Third World nations. However, influenced by changes in the international system; political and economic imperatives, generated by the Cyprus conflict and the energy crisis; and internal political as well as social changes, Turkey's governments in the 1970s began to seek more diversity and independence in their foreign policy. Where this search will lead is a difficult question, the answer to which will be attempted in the following chapter. First, however, it might be useful to examine the direction of Turkey's foreign policy by taking a brief look at her relations with the United States, the Soviet Union and the Middle East during the 1970s.

H. TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1970S

Undoubtedly, the major turning point in Turkish-American relations was the United States arms embargo which followed Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974. However, several other factors contributed to the deterioration of relations between these two countries in the 1970s. The anti-Americanism which began in 1960s continued into the 1970s. By the end of 1970, the radical student movement had gained such momentum that it led to the kidnapping of five American soldiers by the Revolutionary Students Federation -- a highly extremist organization, dedicated to the expulsion of all Americans from Turkey.⁴⁷ It was these events that in part precipitated the ouster of Demirel in March 1971.

The military sponsored governments which lasted until the fall of 1973 put an effective damper on student activist and other radicals, thereby silencing most of the criticism of the government's pro-American activities. However, as we have seen, the government ban on poppy growing and the illusion it gave of the United States dictating Turkish policy provided a rallying point for the forces advocating independence in Turkey's decision making. On the other hand, the Turkish decision in 1974 to resume poppy cultivation provided ammunition to those members in the United States Congress who favored cutting foreign aid, and it probably influenced the arms embargo decision.

Another factor which contributed toward the loosening of Turkey's ties to the United States was the decrease in the

amount of American aid to Turkey after 1968.⁴⁸ The phasing down of American aid to Turkey was based on two considerations. First of all, there was growing reluctance in Washington to continue large aid programs at a time when the United States itself was experiencing an unfavorable trend in its balance of trade. On the other hand, Turkey's economic position improved greatly in the decade following 1964. From a state of perennial deficit in its foreign reserve account, Turkey developed to a point of having large annual surpluses of foreign exchange. Therefore, the effect of reduced American aid on the Turkish economy was very small. Indeed, by 1974 "the accretion of sizeable reserves" states Harris, "freed Turkey from dependence on concessionary assistance from abroad."⁴⁹

The only immediate effect of the decrease in American aid in the late 1960s was that it probably added fuel to the nationalist movement in Turkey. For a long time the nationalists had argued that the Americans benefited more from the alliance than did the Turks. However, after the price of oil skyrocketed in 1974 and the Turks began to feel the effects of the European recession in the form of decreased remittances from workers in Europe, the decrease in United States aid -- especially after the arms embargo -- was felt very strongly in Turkey.

The Turkish-American estrangement following the Cyprus crisis of 1974 took place within the context of growing Turkish nationalism, decreasing American aid, and misunderstanding on both

sides over the poppy question. Moreover, the increasing divergent interests between the allies, with Turkey focusing more and more on regional concerns and rapprochement with the Soviet Union, all served to modify the relationship even before the arms embargo.

The impact on Turkey of the arms embargo which was finally lifted in the summer of 1978 was probably more psychological and political than it was economic. For, even though the Turks are ready to single out the embargo, the roots of their economic problems go far beyond the embargo -- ranging from international economic factors such as the European recession and the energy crisis, to questionable economic policies of Turkey's various governments, to the arms race with Greece. Psychologically the embargo destroyed Turkey's faith in the United States as a reliable ally. Politically, it strengthened the radical groups in Turkey and added to her political and social problems at home.

The repercussions of the arms embargo imposed on Ankara by the United States Congress under pressure from the Greek lobby in February 1975 were immediate. In July 1975, under pressure from both left and right, Premier Demirel, in the past one of Turkey's most pro-American politicians, stopped operational activities at 26 American bases in Turkey.⁵⁰ The partial lifting of the arms embargo in September 1975 was followed in March 1976 by the announcement of a new Turkish-American Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), under which Turkey would receive

\$1 billion in military aid over four years and the 26 American bases in Turkey would be reopened under nominal Turkish control.⁵¹ However, pending a settlement in Cyprus, both President Ford and President Carter were hesitant to present the DCA to Congress for ratification. By April 1978 it still had not been ratified and as House Foreign Relations Committee member Stephen Solarz told a press conference in Ankara, the DCA had become a "museum piece."⁵²

After the 1974 Cyprus crisis, economic and psychological imperatives forced a rethinking of Turkey's role in NATO. Although there has been no move by Turkey to withdraw from NATO, both Ecevit and Demirel have suggested an adjustment of Turkey's NATO role. The current thinking is that Turkey should reduce her role in NATO to a level commensurate with the political and economic support she receives from NATO.⁵³ Due to the timing of Turkish statements concerning her role in NATO, they were generally considered bluffs to influence the American Congress's vote on the arms embargo. But recent actions and statements by Ecevit indicate a real shift in Turkey's defense posture. Already in 1978, he has:

--Rejected NATO's new, long-term defense program arguing that it does not conform to spirit of East-West detente. Additionally, it would have put an additional \$5 billion burden on Turkey's budget for the next five year.

--Revealed a change in Turkey's concept of the external threat. He dismissed the idea that Turkey is threatened by the Soviet Union, which has 15 divisions on the Turkish border.

He has spoken instead of "genuine danger" from other quarters -- presumably Greece -- and announced a redeployment of Turkey's forces to meet "present circumstances."

--Suggested that Turkey reduce the size of her armed forces (currently approximately 450,000 strong and second largest in NATO) by at least one-third and put part of Turkey's forces strictly under Turkish command.

--Announced the development of a new "national" defense program which would continue whether the arms embargo was lifted or not. This new program would take into account Turkey's real defense needs," according to her national interests, and not just NATO's thinking and programs, as has been the case in the past."⁵⁴

Moreover, to counteract any future pressure exerted through an arms embargo, as well as to ease her defense burden, Turkey has stepped up efforts to establish a local defense industry.⁵⁵

The lifting of the arms embargo by the United States Congress in the summer of 1978 opened the way for an improvement in Turkish-American relations. A week after the embargo was lifted the Turkish government decided to allow the reopening of four American bases in Turkey under a provisional status, pending the finalization of a new defense agreement between the two countries.⁵⁶

The future of the other 22 American bases which were deactivated in 1975 is uncertain. On the one hand, Ecevit is known to be quite sensitive on the question of detente and would probably consider the reopening of the installation

designed to monitor Soviet missile activities as a move contributing to the SALT agreement. On the other hand, Turkey is actively pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and therefore, Ecevit would probably like the other American bases (except the NATO base at Incirlik) to be dismantled.⁵⁷

In light of detente and Turkey's reassessment of the external threat, the future of Turkish-American relations --at least until a new external threat is perceived -- will be dictated by economic factors. Premier Ecevit made this perfectly clear in August 1978 when he blamed the United States, "some European allies," and the international banks for Turkey's financial crisis. He said the support given to Turkey by its Western allies would be the "principle factor shaping the nature of our future relations with them."⁵⁸

I. TURKISH-SOVIET RELATIONS

The deterioration of Turkish-American relations in the 1970s is all the more significant because it coincided with, and to some extent reinforced, Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union. This rapprochement culminated in the signing of a Turkish-Soviet document on "principles of goodneighborly and friendly cooperation" in June 1978 -- the first such document to be signed between these two countries since Moscow denounced the 1925 Treaty of Neutrality and Nonaggression in 1945.⁵⁹ While this joint agreement on friendship and cooperation falls considerably short of Moscow's maximum objective -- the signing of a non-aggression pact -- it nonetheless is

indicative of the degree to which Turkish-Soviet relations have improved over the last few years, and it underscores the Soviet's willingness to exploit any trends which might further loosen Turkey's ties to the United States and NATO.

Although it is true that Turkey's efforts to improve her relations with the Soviet Union intensified after she found herself isolated following the 1974 Cyprus crisis, the framework of the 1978 agreement is contained in the "Declaration of Principles of Good Neighbor Relations" issued during Soviet President Podgorni's visit to Turkey in 1972.⁶⁰ The declaration covered all the sensitive points of contention between the two states to include:

- 1) Development of relations between the two countries in conformity with traditions of peace, friendship and good neighborhood as established by Kemal Atatürk and V. I. Lenin.
- 2) Respect for the sovereignty and equality of nations.
- 3) Respect for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of the states.
- 4) Non-interferences in the domestic affairs of states.
- 5) Respect for the inalienable right of every state to choose and develop its own political, economic, social and cultural system.
- 6) Non-recourse to force or to the threat of force, refusal to permit authorization for aggression and for other subversive activities to other states.
- 7) Respect for the obligations springing from treaties and other sources of international law.

8) Resolution of international disputes by peaceful means.⁶¹

Thus, the political document on "friendship and cooperation" which first saw light during the 1971-1973 era of military backed governments and was revived by Demirel's government during Premier Kosgin's 1975 visit⁶² was eventually signed by Ecevit in 1978.

Both the Soviets and the Turks have benefited from the lessening of tension between their two states. The Soviet Union no longer faces direct confrontation on her southern border. Its naval policy in the eastern Mediterranean cannot help but benefit from a less hostile and less suspicious Turkey. But more importantly, the Soviets are edging closer to their ultimate goal of destroying, or at least severely weakening NATO's southeastern flank. Since the late 1960s Soviet military aircraft have been permitted to overfly Turkey on their way to the Middle East, including resupply missions during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. But in January 1978, reflecting a desire to maintain a balance between her East and West relations, Turkey, acting upon American and NATO intelligence reports, cautioned the Soviets about the great increase of military flights over her territory to Ethiopia. Reflecting their desire to maintain friendly relations with Turkey, the Soviet reduced the number overflights.⁶³ The overflights and the uncontested passage of the Soviet aircraft carrier Kiev through the Bosphorus in July 1976 -- in technical violation of the Montreux Convention⁶⁴ -- were probably intended by Ankara as

a means to demonstrate to the West the consequences of a Turkish withdrawal from NATO. Equally, however, they reflected Turkey's movement towards a more flexible relationship with the Soviet Union.

For their part, the Turks have benefited both politically and economically from this rapprochement. In the past, the Soviet Union was one of the strongest supporters of Archbishop Makarios; but now, while she continues to call for the demilitarization of Cyprus, Moscow recognizes the existence of the two communities and accepts the granting of equal rights to both. Moreover, the Soviets have expressed opposition to any kind of Cyprus-Greece union and ended the exclusive relationship they accorded to the late Greek-Cypriot leader, Makarios. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has exercised extreme caution on the Cyprus issue so as to avoid any anti-Turkish stance.⁶⁵

In addition to gaining a more understanding Soviet attitude on the Cyprus issue, Turkey has reaped enormous economic gains from her rapprochement with the Soviets. After 1974, Moscow stepped up its courtship of Turkey in an effort to exploit the strains in Turkish-American relations resulting from the Cyprus issue. Since the Soviet courtship of the Turks began in 1953, Turkey has received more than \$1.2 billion in economic credits and grants from Moscow, including a huge \$650 million credit in 1975. In fact, in 1975 Turkey was the leading recipient of Soviet foreign aid, receiving more than half of all Soviet aid to the Free World.⁶⁶

In conjunction with the document on "friendship and cooperation," two additional agreements were signed by the Turks and the Soviets in 1978. The first was an agreement on the continental shelf in the Black Sea. Although at the time, Turkey was not engaged in sea bed exploration in any disputed areas of the Black Sea, the agreement could avert trouble in the future. Moreover, it stands out as an example to Greece that the Aegean Sea continental shelf dispute can be solved through direct negotiations. The other document was a three-year economic and trade agreement providing for the export of Soviet oil, payable by Turkish wheat and other products. This agreement will allow Turkey to meet one fourth of its imported oil needs without having to pay scarce hard currency.⁶⁷ The signing of these agreements followed in the wake of Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua's visit to Ankara in June 1978. Hua's visit undoubtedly influenced Moscow's willingness to negotiate terms favorable to Turkey.⁶⁸

Turkey's contacts with the Balkan communist countries were also more productive in the 1970s. A series of State visits between Turkey and her communist Balkan neighbors have, in the past few years, yielded many concrete results in political, economic and cultural cooperation.⁶⁹ The left-leaning government of Premier Ecevit which came to power in January 1978 has been very active in its attempts to build upon and expand Turkey's contacts with her socialist neighbors that were initiated by the previous governments.⁷⁰

In all, Turkey's new orientation toward economic cooperation with the Eastern Bloc has been productive and promises to be much more so in the future. According to a CIA report compiled from Department of State sources, at the end of 1976 Turkey was discussing Communist participation in \$2.2 billion worth of industrial projects under a series of broad economic agreement that assure Communist countries a growing role in Ankara's development plans.⁷¹

J. TURKEY AND THE MIDDLE EAST

As a result of the combination of the various internal and external factors discussed earlier, in the 1970s, Turkey's efforts to improve her ties with the countries of the Middle East have gained steady momentum. As we have seen, Turkey's initial moves to establish closer relations with the Middle Eastern countries were motivated by a desire to break out of the political isolation in which she found herself following the 1960's Cyprus crises. In the 1970s, however, while international support for her Cyprus position continued to influence her foreign policy vis-a-vis the Third World, domestic political factors and economic imperatives became the prime motivators of Turkey's Middle East policies.

The rise of the National Salvation Party (NSP), whose ideology is ultra-Islamic, reflects the emergence in Turkey of a nationalism based on a return to Islamic fundamentalism. This religiously-oriented nationalism has been characterized in Turkish foreign policy by a desire for closer ties with

the Arab world and an increasingly skeptical attitude towards the benefits of Turkey's ties with the West. "Paradoxically" states Larrabee, "such calls have coincided with, and served to reinforce, demands for a more autonomous foreign policy on the left."⁷² While its support is at present confined to a minority, the NSP has to-date been an important member of three coalition governments, and supported by Turkey's ailing economy it has influenced the orientation of Turkish foreign policy. But, there were other more pragmatic reasons for establishing closer relations with the Arab world.

Support on Cyprus and religious sentiments aside, perhaps the most important reason for Turkey's new Middle Eastern orientation has been economics. The energy crisis, her severe shortage of foreign capital and misunderstandings with the EEC drove Turkey toward the Middle East in search of oil, jobs for her workers, hard currency and, perhaps most important, markets for Turkish consumer goods. It is no accident that the thrust of Turkey's efforts have centered on the oil producing Arab countries: Libya, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq.⁷³

In the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey held a steady course favoring the Arabs and refused the use of American and NATO bases against Arab interests. Since the war she has consistently voted in favor of Arab resolutions in the UN.⁷⁴

Although Turkey has participated in all the Islamic conferences, because of Ataturk's tenet of laicism, she had approached the Muslim conferences with reservations. But as the meetings became more politically and economically oriented,

"Turkey's inhibitions melted to the extent of sponsoring a meeting in Istanbul."⁷⁵ On the first day of the Seventh Islamic Conference held in Istanbul in 1976, Turkey announced that she would become a full member, and reinforced this move by granting the PLO permission to open a bureau in Ankara. In return, the Islamic nations voted for a resolution supporting Turkey's position on Cyprus.⁷⁶ Since then, cooperation and trade with the Arab nations have increased, but remain far less than expected. It would seem, as Karpat notes, "that politics, economic interests and religious sympathies do not mix." The Turkish economy, with its high inflation and unemployment, apparently remains unattractive to most Arab investors. Furthermore, old political obstacles such as Turkey's commitment to secular politics, her weak but still viable Western ties and her reluctance to completely sever diplomatic relations with Israel remain to be surmounted.

Turkey's relations with the non-Arab countries of the Middle East -- her CENTO allies, Iran and Pakistan -- have not come up to expectation. This has primarily been because of domestic political instability in all three countries, and the fact that their differing priorities have kept them fixed to their own planned directions, far different and far short of the vision of their long-range common interest. However, the signing of the Izmir Treaty at the RCD summit meeting in March 1977 holds some hope for the future of economic and political cooperation between these countries. This treaty established a number of new institutions and set forth the guidelines for more concerted

industrial efforts.⁷⁷ The future of RCD, as well as CENTO, will depend a great deal upon the political and social stability of the member countries.

Outside of the Middle East, Turkey has embarked on a new diplomatic drive to develop ties to the Third World. Stating that it was in keeping with Turkey's new "multilateral" foreign policy and did not represent a threat to her role in NATO, Turkish Foreign Minister Gündüz Ökcün announced in July 1978, Ankara's intention to seek membership in the "non-aligned movement." Turkey's motives for this move would appear to be obvious. First, Turkey needs political support, particularly on Cyprus. In the past, the non-aligned countries have sided with the Greek Cypriots. Second, the non-aligned bloc represents vast market for Turkish products. Finally, according to Cohen, Ecevit's government feels that such a move will regain for Turkey "a more independent and sovereign line in international relations."⁷⁸

Turkey's new direction in foreign policy of the 1970s -- a policy based on a pragmatic assessment of international and domestic factors -- was summed up quite aptly by then Premier Demirel. Turkey, he said, would remain faithful to its commitments to the West. "We are following a multilateral foreign policy," he added. "The intention is to make a sufficient number of friends which will act with us on economic matters and just causes and surround ourselves with a ring of friendship and cooperation. When Britain, the United States

and France are in cooperation with the Soviet Union why should Turkey rely on one door? Why suffice with what is limited?"⁷⁹

CHAPTER V FOOTNOTES

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VI. SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS

He who would have peace in his own house should not knock on his neighbor's door. - Turkish Proverb

He who embraces much, collects little.
- Turkish Proverb

The wound from a knife heals; the wound from a tongue never heals.
- Turkish Proverb

A. DETERMINANTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Too often, the Cyprus conflict has been singled out as the factor which has brought about a change in the foreign policy orientation of Turkey.¹ As we have seen the Cyprus conflicts of the 1960s and 1970s played an important role in Turkey's new foreign policy orientation, but to credit Turkey's new orientation to the Cyprus factor alone would be, as Tamkoç points out, "to view such a complex issue as the Cyprus conflict as if it had occurred in a vacuum... and to belittle the capabilities of the Turkish warrior diplomats to protect and promote the vital national interests of their country."² The Cyprus conflict, of course, did not occur in a vacuum. Turkey's new orientation in foreign policy is the result of the pragmatic assessment by Turkish statesmen of the changing domestic and international environment in which they found themselves at the time. At the same time, their pragmatism was tempered by the restraints imposed by their domestic and international situations.

1. The Changing Domestic Scene

In the period following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 up until 1950 the Turkish domestic scene was characterized by rapid political, social and cultural change. During this period Turkey was transformed from a backward, traditional Middle Eastern country into a Western oriented, rapidly modernizing nation. Foreign policy was the exclusive domain of a small group of elites embodied in the RPP. Public interest, if indeed there was any, played no role in foreign affairs.

The 1950s was a period of rapid economic growth, characterized by the emergence of an alternate political elite. The rise of a new middle class based on economic activity and the introduction of a multi-party system gave the private entrepreneur and the rural groups an opportunity to gain political influence. "The multi-party system, the press, the universities and the intellectuals," states Eren, "emerged as contentious participants in the formulation of foreign policy."³ The 1950s were also characterized by a growing dependence on foreign aid -- a dependence largely dictated by local political pressures that had to be heeded once free elections were allowed.

The 1960s witnessed important political and social changes in Turkey. The democratization and liberalization introduced by the 1961 Constitution and the changes introduced into Turkey's electoral system succeeded in injecting domestic concerns into foreign affairs. Rapid developments in communication

and increased social and physical mobility forced changes in the traditional character of Turkish society -- changes that were bound to affect the country's national and international politics. These political and social changes created conditions which intensified conflict and led to the emergence of a multipolar polity. The new atmosphere of freedom facilitated the introduction and dissemination of ideologies that possessed a considerable attraction for those groups in the society with problems of development, equality and justice. For the first time in history a genuine socialist movement emerged in Turkey. All these changes broke the national consensus on foreign policy. The injection of domestic concerns into foreign affairs and public questioning of the conduct of foreign affairs, both previously considered dangerous and even traitorous to national interests, became generally accepted.

The domestic scene of the 1970s has been a continuation of events initiated by the liberal atmosphere following the 1961 Constitution. Fractionalization and polarization in Turkey's political system have produced one political crisis after another. Student unrest, political violence and anti-American sentiment is now common place in Turkey. Inflation, unemployment and a high birth rate all compound Turkey's severe economic problems. Radical groups from both the Left and the Right are demanding a more autonomous Turkish foreign policy.

In a period of less than two decades, beginning in the 1950s, Turkish foreign policy has evolved from an exclusive

privilege of a small elite group, who neither wanted nor tolerated public opinion, to a subject of unending debate among the various political parties who actively seek public opinion. So radical has been the change says Eren, "that public interest in foreign policy is now solicited as an expression of patriotism."⁴

Public interest and concern in Turkish foreign affairs was clearly demonstrated in a poll conducted by the Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet prior to the October 1975 senatorial elections. Responding to a list of fifteen problems of national importance, the majority of those who participated gave priority to the four issues related to Turkish foreign affairs: foreign trade, membership in the EEC, foreign investment, and problems of Turkish workers abroad.⁵ Yet, by 1977, reflecting a shift in priorities, a poll conducted by Ecevit prior to the general elections of that year revealed that domestic issues, especially economic ones and security of life, were the main issues in the campaign. Referring to the American embargo Ecevit said; "At the moment there are more vital and urgent questions concerning the Turkish public."⁶ Regardless of the emphasis of public interest on foreign versus domestic affairs, the focus in both these polls remained the same -- economic issues -- and clearly illustrates, as we have seen, the emergence of economic imperatives as the dominant factor in Turkey's foreign policy.

2. The Changing International Scene

The relative calm and "balance of power" structure of the international system following World War I and the formation of the Turkish Republic allowed Atatürk to conduct a policy of external non-involvement and internal development. Turkish foreign policy during this time was characterized by regionalism -- a regionalism that all but ignored the Arab world. It was not until fascism reared its ugly head in the 1930s that Turkish foreign affairs really began to extend beyond her neighboring countries. It was the structure of the international system during this period between the two World Wars, coupled with Turkey's traditional instinct for global balance of power and a keen sense of her delicate international position that allowed Turkey to regain sole control of the Turkish Straits through the Montreux Convention.

Turkey's ability to remain neutral throughout most of World War II was due mainly to the importance afforded to her strategic position by the world powers and skillful manipulation by İnönü. Her desire to remain neutral was predicated a great deal on the perceived threat posed by the Soviets either as a foe or an ally.

The bipolarity of the international system which evolved after World War II, probably more than any other event in her history, established the direction of Turkish foreign policy. Her geographic location between the two poles of power and the strategic significance of the Turkish Straits probably would

not have allowed Turkey to take a neutral position even if she had wanted to do so. As it happened, the Soviet threat to her territorial integrity and the subsequent aid offered by the United States locked Turkey into a pro-Western alignment. Her political, economic and cultural commitment to the West isolated Turkey from the Third World countries, in most of whom she held little if any interest anyway. However, systemic changes and international events during the 1960s and 1970s were to change Turkey's perceptions not only concerning the Third World countries, but the Soviet Bloc as well.

Detente, the reversal of the Soviets' hostile attitude, new defense strategies dictated by technological changes, and the perceived (if not all together real) decline in American interest and support of Turkey all led to a reappraisal of Turkey strict -- almost paranoid -- Western alignment. The significance of these changes lies in the fact that they not only offered Turkish leaders more options, but they also added impetus to the growing radical forces within Turkish society.

At the same time, their great voting strength in international forums such as the UN and their newly found economic strength due to the "raw material revolution," exemplified by the 1973 Arab oil embargo, afforded a vastly increased importance to countries and regions that the Turks previously had been accustomed to disregard.

3. The Cyprus Crisis

Mention of the Cyprus dispute was intentionally omitted from the above summary of the domestic and international changes affecting Turkish foreign policy. This was done so in order to illustrate that these external and internal factors would have in all probability eventually led to the more flexible independent and multilateral foreign policy we see emerging in Turkey today. Nevertheless, the Cyprus disputes did occur and the issues arising from these disputes did have a great impact on Turkish foreign policy.

The Cyprus dispute, which touched upon a deep psychological cord in the personality of the modern Turk, acted as a catalyst for change in Turkish foreign policy by consolidating and intensifying the current issues and trends in both the domestic and international arenas. The careless and sometimes irresponsible reaction by the United States and NATO to events surrounding Cyprus touched off a new form of nationalism in Turkey and turned its wrath against the West. The Soviets have been quite willing to exploit this weakness in Turkey's Western alignment. Time and again the Cyprus dispute illustrated to Turkey the degree of isolation her strict Western orientation had brought to her. The cost of her Cyprus operations, the resulting arms race with Greece and the American arms embargo all aggravated Turkey's economic condition which had already begun to feel the effects of the European recession and rising oil prices.

All together, events in recent years have imposed an identity crisis upon the Turkish people. Westernization has not been easy for the Turks who, after all, came from Asia, professed Islam and belonged to the traditional Middle Eastern world. Now the Turks feel themselves left alone; not a true member of the Middle Eastern Islamic World; not part of the Third World; not part of the Communist Bloc; and, as they see it, betrayed and rejected by the Western Bloc to which they tried so hard to belong.⁷

B. NEW DIRECTIONS: WHERE WILL THEY LEAD?

There is a cryptic Turkish story that tells about a young man who consults a wise man named Hoca (pronounced Ho'ja) about his future. "What shall I do?" asked the youth, "I am poor and lonely." "Do not worry," replied Hoca, "Everything will be all right." "You mean," said the young man excitedly, "that I will become rich and famous and have lots of friends?" "No," said Hoca, "I mean that soon you will get used to being poor and lonely."⁸

The parellel between the young man in the story and Turkey today is unmistakable; but, must they share the same future -- a future where getting better equates to getting "used to being poor and lonely?" Is this where Turkey's new flexible, multilateral foreign policy leading? Will Turkey, while attempting to exploit all her options and please everyone end up by limiting her options and pleasing no one? The answer has to be no. Turkey has inherited a very strong consciousness

of national unity that has proven its effectiveness in times of crisis. Since the time of Atatürk, Turkey's leaders have time and again proven their ability to adjust her delicate strategic position to changes in the international system. Although presently suffering from the maladies which have affected many Western countries, the Turkish economy possesses great potential. However, the Turkish Republic continues to rest on solid political foundations. The fractionalism which has plagued her party politics appears to be on the decline, and the possibilities of a strong majority government in the future appear good -- much will depend upon how successful Ecevit is in dealing with Turkey's domestic and foreign problems during his time in office.

1. Turkey's Options

It is evident that in recent years there has been a major rethinking of Turkey's foreign policy orientation. The question then becomes, where will Turkey's new foreign policy lead? Some have argued for a Third World type of neutrality based on, if you will, alignment with the non-aligned countries.⁹ The basis for their argument seems to center on the need for Third World support in the UN on the Cyprus question. This argument is at best transitory; for, even if Turkey succeeded in gaining Third World support in the UN, it would not help her in any real emergency. Nevertheless, the idea is popular in some circles of Turkish society and there is the possibility of economic gains through new markets for Turkish products.

Thus, while, as Bernard Lewis points out, "Turkish statesmen are well aware that Third Worldism is an illusion,"¹⁰ they have made moves toward joining the non-aligned movement.

Others favor an alignment with the Islamic countries of the Middle East. The most vocal spokesman on this line is Erbakan, the leader of the ultra-Islamic NSP. As we have seen, there has been a notable change in Turkey policy vis-a-vis the Middle East, the most notable at the 1976 Islamic Conference. Erbakan stresses Turkey's common Islamic and cultural ties with the Arabs. But, the more pragmatic Turkish statesmen (and probably Erbakan also) see the more tangible benefits of a closer relationship with the Arabs. Support for her Cyprus position is a definite possibility, but the vast new markets for her manufactured goods and the opportunity to attract Arab investments are far and away the strongest arguments for a flexible Turkish policy in the Middle East.

Most Turks probably realize that while an alignment with the Third World or the Arab countries might offer some small political and economic advantages, these countries have little real political or military power, and that in any real military emergency there is nothing they would or could do to help. Considering Turkey's history and her location on the southern border of the Soviet Union, exclusive alliance with either of these militarily weak blocs would be unthinkable. Therefore, Turkey's relations with the Arab countries and other non-aligned nations will probably, if they materialize at all, take the form of bilateral agreements with individual countries

rather than any broad commitment to a specific bloc. These agreements would not have to affect Turkey's Western alignment. In fact, such moves should be encouraged by the Western countries, since they could strengthen Turkey economically, thus easing the financial burden the other NATO countries are faced with in helping Turkey modernize and maintain her large army.

But what if the United States abandons Turkey, or if the United States acts in a way (such as Congress reimposing the arms embargo due to lack of a Cyprus settlement -- a real possibility) that compels Turkey to abandon the United States? Then suggest Lewis, "The Third World and Islamic alternatives might tide the government over a domestic crisis by presenting an acceptable illusion of solidarity to the Turkish people and allowing them to believe that they are not entirely alone in the world."¹¹

If reliance on America became impossible for the Turks, another alternative might be, as suggested by Batu, a more European foreign policy. In this event, a closer association with the Arab World might enable Turkey to become the bridge between Europe and the Middle East envisioned by Batu. However, if the voice of Greece, who expects to become a full member of the EEC in the near future, weighs too heavily in the counsels of Europe, a neutralist policy might then gain ground in Turkey.

The option of Turkish neutralism has also been much discussed. For many years now there has been talk of a Swedish style neutrality.¹² The Soviet Union is known to be ready to sign a

nonaggression pact. Turkey, however, does not have the political stability nor the economic wealth of Sweden. The cost of financing a modern arm to guarantee her neutrality would be enormous and completely devastate Turkey's economy. Moreover, Sweden has Finland as a buffer between herself and the Soviets. Turkey, on the other hand shares a common border with the Soviets and is surrounded on the other sides by potentially hostile countries such as Bulgaria, Greece and Syria.

At present, the only other viable option for Turkey outside of the Western Bloc would seem to be the Soviet Union. Yet there are few, if any, Turks except for the radical Leftists who wish to be included in the Soviet Bloc. Yet, pragmatic assessments of world conditions have already led Turkish leaders into many kinds of accommodation with the Soviet Union. It would be a serious omission to fail to point out that the Turkish leaders are aware of the dangers of their increased relationships with the Soviets. When a small state lives in the shadow of a major power, there is always the possibility of aggression or that national independence may be undermined by subversion. Though Soviet activities following World War II may be beyond the memory of many young Turks, the spectacle of Soviet troops invading Czechoslovakia in 1968 is not that far back in history. Responsible Turkish political figures appear to have few illusions about the course they are following with the Soviets. Only time will tell, however, whether centuries of experience with the Russians have taught the Turks how to handle the Soviets.

One additional option should be mentioned. Although the chances are remote, barring any radical change in Turkey such as a coup by the Leftists, that the Turks would voluntarily align themselves with a Communist power, that power could be PRC. Considering Turkey's historical experiences with the Russians and the fact that the Sino-Soviet dispute would act in favor of Turkey by balancing the Chinese against the Soviets, this sort of arrangement, much like the one Albania had with the PRC, is not out of the realm of possibility. An added attraction of this arrangement would be that while the PRC acted as a deterrent to Soviet aggression toward Turkey, the Soviets themselves would be serving as a buffer between Turkey and undue Chinese influence.

Returning to more realistic possibilities, as long as Turkey is located within the expansion zone of the Soviet Union -- a geographic reality which cannot be changed --, and is incapable of meeting the Soviet expansion solely with her own powers -- and economic and physical reality --, she has a vital interest, in fact, a dire necessity to participate in a system of alliance to assure her security. Since there exists today, nor in the foreseeable future, no power other than NATO that is capable of meeting the Soviet threat, Turkey's continued membership in NATO is a foregone conclusion. Consequently, the question now becomes not whether or not to stay in NATO, but rather how to reduce the disadvantages of NATO membership while enjoying the advantages.¹³ It would seem that this is the objective of Turkey's current multilateral foreign policy.

2. Future Directions

In the foreseeable future Turkey can be expected to continue her pursuit of an independent multilateral foreign policy while remaining a member of the Western alliance. Turkey's new foreign policy might have, as some American critics have argued, been influenced by a desire to bluff and blackmail the West;¹⁴ but, even if this allegation is true, events have now carried Turkey far beyond the bluffing stage. Now that the difficult steps have been taken to establish a new direction in their foreign policy the Turks would hardly think of reversing it, for they see it as a beneficial development, a boost to national pride. Moreover, although the arms embargo has been conditionally lifted, the basic conditions that generated the reappraisal of Turkish policy -- e.g., Cyprus, economic imperatives, disillusionment with the West, political isolation -- remain basically unchanged. Admittedly, much will depend on the party in power and the strength of its government. Ecevit's RPP will be the one most likely to strengthen the independent line, but Demirel's JP will, considering the changing domestic and international scenes, have to follow suit.

What can be expected from Turkey in the future? First, the state of the world calls for Turkey to secure the utmost protection through a regular army maintained through outside assistance within the framework NATO. Considering the enormous problems presented by a change in arms supplier, Turkey will

continue to use American and NATO arms, but will strive to increase the number of sources for these arms to prevent, or at least minimize the effects of any future embargo by one source. Cyprus clearly demonstrated the need for a military force outside of NATO, established and maintained through Turkey's own resources.

Turkish-American relations should improve greatly now that the major obstacle -- the arms embargo -- has been removed. However, the estrangement over Cyprus cannot ever be fully reconciled and future Turkish-American relations will be conducted on a formal basis within the guidelines established by NATO and future bilateral agreements.

The future focus of Turkey's Western line will be Europe, and probably fall upon West Germany. Efforts will be made to reconcile Turkey's position in the EEC, but not at the expense of Turkish industries or her search for new markets in the Middle East.

Turkey would like to establish herself as the economic bridge between the technologically advanced countries of Europe and the vast oil richmarkets in the Middle East. This is the idea behind Ecevit's "three ring theory" which he stated in London in 1975¹⁵ and alluded to in his foreign policy statement in 1978.¹⁶ The Europeans will probably encourage this trend for both its economic and political advantages, but Arab resistance will be much more difficult to overcome.

In the Middle East, Turkey will redouble her efforts to establish more economic and political bridgeheads, similar to the ones she now enjoys with Libya and to a lesser extent Iraq. The emphasis of her approach to the Arabs will probably shift from shared religious and cultural values, which have proven relatively ineffective in the past, and focus more on political and economic realities. The outlook for increased cooperation with Iran and Pakistan is good, but, as stated before, much will depend upon the stability of their various government.

At the same time, Turkey will continue her search for the "illusionary" Third World in hopes of finding new markets and support in the various world forums.

Turkey will, because she must, settle her dispute with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. However, while she may be willing to make some territorial concessions on Cyprus,¹⁷ nothing short of war is likely to change Turkey's conditions for a bizonal, bicomunal, federal and independent Cyprus.

Most importantly, for the United States as well as Turkey, Turkish statesmen will continue to seek rapprochement with the Communist countries. Within the framework of NATO and consistent with her Western alignment, Turkey will continue to explore new avenues of economic, cultural and even limited political cooperation with the Soviet Union. Economic and political agreements with her Balkan neighbors will continue to be a facet of Turkey's multilateral foreign policy. Recent

visits by Chinese statesmen have opened the way for improved relations with the PRC. However, Turkey will proceed carefully along this route to avoid any estrangement in her new found relations with the Soviets.

In summary, Turkey expects, and should reap, many economic and political advantages from the application of her new foreign policy. In the conduct of this policy, Turkey will be guided by two overriding considerations. First, the permanent relevance of her geostrategic location, which even today retains its historic importance, must be given priority. Secondly, Turkey's leaders must deal with the economic imperatives of a rapidly growing economy and the impatience of a people hungry for higher socio - economic standards. Turkey's hope for the future, which will be determined by the ability of her leaders to deal effectively with economic imperatives was summed up by Premier Ecevit in June 1978. He said:

If we can fully exploit Turkey's location in the world and the prestige it has gained from history and from its ties with free democracy; if we can exploit them responsibly, and if we can exploit them in a way compatible with the realities and conditions of our times, many possibilities could be opened for Turkey in today's world.¹⁸

CHAPTER VI FOOTNOTES

¹For specific individuals and their assertions, see Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, pp. 282-283.

²Ibid.

³Eren, Turkey, NATO and Europe, p. 8.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., pp. 9-10.

⁶Pulse (Ankara), 6 May 1977.

⁷On Turkey's search for identity, see Arnold Hottinger, "Kemal Atatürk's Heritage," Encounter (February 1977), pp. 75-81.

⁸Ziya Sak, comp., Nasrettin Hoca Hikayleleri (Stories of Nasrettin Hoca) (Istanbul: Duran Press, 1968), pp. 44-45.

⁹See for example, Mumtaz Soysal's remarks in "The Future of Turkey," The Middle East, December 1977, pp. 95-98. Also, at least 80 members of the RPP favor closer relations with the non-aligned nations. Pulse (Ankara), 15 March 1978.

¹⁰Bernard Lewis, "Turkey Turns Away," New Republic, 18 February 1978, p. 20.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Andrew Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, The Washington Papers, no. 8, 1975), p. 48.

¹³For a listing of the advantages of NATO membership for Turkey, see Eren, Turkey, NATO and Europe, pp. 46-51. On the other side of the coin, for a listing of the advantages for the U.S. and NATO of Turkey's membership, see Albert Wohlstetter, "Lift the Turkish Arms Embargo," Wall Street Journal, 14 June 1978.

¹⁴Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally, p. 47.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 47-48.

¹⁶Pulse (Anakra), 13 January 1978.

¹⁷The territorial issue centers around the fact that the Turks who represent about 18% of the island's population now occupy just less than 40% of the land. However, the most common scheme espoused in Western circles (including Greece) that land percentage should approximate population percentage is invalid since the Turkish Cypriots, as farmers, have always owned more than 18% of the land -- about 40% at the time of the 1960 census. See Wohlstetter, "Lift the Turkish Arms Embargo."

¹⁸FBIS Daily Report, 16 June 1978.

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